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From *Amor Sui* to *Amour de Soi-Même*: Rousseau's Reconfiguration of Augustinian Self-Love

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In Note XV of his *Second Discourse*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously distinguishes between two forms of love: *amour de soi-même* (self-love, understood as self-preservation), and *amour-propre* (self-love, understood as vanity). Several centuries earlier, another thinker introduced a different set of loves, whose distinction came to anchor the entire worldview of Christendom while it lasted. These, of course, were Augustine's *amor Dei* and *amor sui*, understood by Augustine to mean the love of God, carried as far as contempt of self, and love of self, ballooning to the point of contempt for God.[1] Because of the insidiousness of self-love within this framework, and because of the prominence of Augustinian currents in seventeenth-century French thought, Rousseau's erasure of the love of God and his division of self-love into forms good and bad would have stood out immediately to his readers as provocative. It would have read as a radical rejection of Augustine's vision of human nature and the human condition as we know it.

Yet, today we might wonder, how familiar was Rousseau with Augustine's conceptual pairing, and how consciously was he offering his own in its place? Thanks to his letter to Christophe de Beaumont, we know that Rousseau explicitly rejected the Augustinian Doctrine of Original Sin. Rereading Rousseau's *Second Discourse* in light of this letter and the Augustinian Genesis

account, as I argue in this article, gives us strong reason to conclude that Rousseau did in fact set up his division between *amour de soi-même* and *amour propre* as a replacement for Augustine's dichotomy and all that it suggested about human nature. I also suggest that Rousseau writes his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* as a replacement for Augustine's account of the Fall—or, at least, how that account had been received in the century prior.[2]

Significantly, the seventeenth-century Augustine is a harsh figure whose thought had become systematized and therefore evacuated of its true spirit.[3] More than this, it had become unmoored from Augustine's metaphysical worldview: from his *sacramental* worldview.[4] For the fifth-century Augustine, Platonic metaphysics, recast by the Incarnation, opened up the possibility of seeing the created order as participatory—that is, as both receptive to and cooperative in the divine plan. In other words, the real Augustine was committed to what John Henry Newman has called "the sacramental principle," the view that created things are susceptible to grace and capable of being united with God thereby.[5] According to this principle, divine agency and creaturely agency are, it is important to note, not in competition. Rather, created things maintain themselves and their causal reality while being receptive to the interventions of a God whose power and love already upholds them. In this view, God is entirely transcendent, the ground of all creaturely agency, but also entirely engaged in the world He has created.

Crucially, for our purposes, the sacramental principle teaches that grace underwrites and perfects human nature, goodness, and efficacy without undermining or sidestepping them. Grace, in other words, works *in* us, not simply on us. Shorn of this principle, Augustine's teachings fragment into two antinomic alternatives, only one of which was recognized by the culture of Rousseau's day as "Augustinian."[6] In the one so recognized, God's grace was the cause of everything good in man, whereas in the other, man was naturally oriented toward goodness. Pressed into a choice between these two alternatives by the erasure of Augustinianism's sacramental

framework, Rousseau sides with a radical humanism, suggesting alongside Pelagius—Augustine's fifth-century foe—that man is naturally good and that vice is a mere product of social contagion.

In what follows, therefore, I read Rousseau's *Origin of Inequality* as an anti-Augustinian fable, contending, all the same, that it is rooted in a misinterpretation of Augustine.[7] Sketching out the vision of Augustine with which it seems Rousseau was familiar, based on his letter to the archbishop of Paris, Christophe de Beaumont, I herein make the case that Rousseau saw Augustine as the originator of a problematic vision of human nature. More than this, I suggest that he sought to replace it with an alternative vision, perhaps consonant with Christianity as he understood it.[8] I then end with some comments about what his vision of Augustine lacks—namely, the sacramental principle—and offer some brief thoughts as to why the sacramental principle is worth recovering in political philosophy.[9]

First, let's consider what I mean by suggesting that the *Second Discourse* is an anti-Augustinian fable. In *Rousseau's Exemplary Life*, Christopher Kelly argues that Rousseau's compositions "present moral fables that succeeded in forming a popular taste for country life against the corruption of the city."[10] Writing that fables "wrap useful truths in sensible and agreeable forms," Kelly makes the case that Rousseau saw the fabular presentation of history as a salutary political practice, common in the ancient world, and worth recovering.[11] To this end, he quotes a passage from *Emile*, in which Rousseau writes:

> The ancient historians are filled with views which one could use even if the facts which present them were false. But we do not know how to get any true advantage from history. Critical erudition absorbs everything as if it were very important whether a fact is true, provided that a useful teaching can be drawn from it. Sensible men ought to regard history as a tissue of fables whose moral is very appropriate to the human heart.[12]

What if this is true of the history Rousseau gives in the *Second Discourse*? If it is the case that Rousseau viewed the Augustinian tale of Adam and Eve as an *uns*alutary fable, is it not possible that the embellishments Rousseau makes to his history of humankind is presented precisely as its antidote?

This possibility becomes all the more likely once one recalls that the primary audience to whom Rousseau dedicates the *Second Discourse* is his own Geneva—a notably Calvinist city-state.[13] Although he highly extols his homeland in his epistle dedicatory, Rousseau is elsewhere disparaging of its theological underpinnings, criticizing its leaders' willingness to make theological pronouncements. Thanks to Patrick Riley's study *The General Will before Rousseau*, we know that Rousseau had a deep familiarity with Genevan history, believing its religious decrees were more products of political power than theological insight.[14] Writing scornfully, for example, of Geneva's presumption in declaring that Christ died solely for the salvation of the elect, Rousseau maintains in his *Letters Written from the Mountain* that civil authorities should not make pronouncements about religious doctrine.[15] It is notable, of course, that in in making such a decree the Genevan church took the Augustinian vision, encapsulated in the twin Doctrines of Original Sin and the Necessity of Grace, to their logical conclusion. Rousseau is not wrong to be wary of their claim. It is, I argue, where we see the most troubling elements of an anti-sacramental Augustinianism rise to the fore: the need to deny the agency of creatures in order to preserve God's omnipotence and the willingness to maintain that God leaves most human beings in sin in order to protect the idea that grace is irresistible.[16]

As Riley convincingly argues, Rousseau was well aware not only of the history of Calvinist politics in Geneva but also of the Jansenist arguments prevalent in seventeenth-century France. Because the Jansenists and the Calvinists both touted an extreme form of Augustinianism in which fallen man could *only* sin, grace was irresistible, and Christ died only for the elect, it is unsurprising that Rousseau ultimately rejected the Doctrine of Original Sin as

he understood it.[17] Indeed, in his letter to the archbishop of Paris, Christophe de Beaumont, Rousseau says as much. Defending himself against de Beaumont's allegations that his writings, especially *Emile*, are insidious, he calls the entire Augustinian vision into question, writing:

> [I]t is not at all certain, in my view, that this Doctrine of Original Sin, subject as it is to such terrible difficulties, is contained in the Scriptures either as clearly or as harshly as it has pleased the Rhetorician Augustine and our Theologians to construct it. Is it conceivable that God creates so many innocent and pure souls purposely to join them to guilty bodies, to make them contract moral corruption thereby, and to condemn them all to hell for no other crime than this union that is his work?[18]

Rousseau's objection, in other words, is that the Augustinian interpretation of Genesis is both harsh and problematic. More than this, it does not seem to be rooted in the text. Audaciously suggesting that it *pleased* Augustine and his theologian followers to interpret the text in the way they have, he goes on to build his own case as to why the Doctrine of Original Sin cannot be reconciled with his notion of a good God. His case can be summarized thus: It would be unfair for God to create human beings knowing that sin would ultimately be transmitted to each new generation through no fault of their own. This would mean that each person would be born utterly dependent on the whim of God for the grace necessary to be preserved from eternal damnation—a grace that He apparently gives out sparingly. Ultimately, Rousseau's shocking suggestion is this: Augustine has read the Doctrine of Original Sin *into* the Genesis account, and only through the power of his rhetoric did his vision win out over that of Pelagius. Now Rousseau enlists his own rhetorical prowess to push back.

From Rousseau's perspective, the sin of Adam is not nearly so grave as to warrant the kind of punishment that the "Rhetorician Augustine" believes God gave him. Significantly, Rousseau seems

to think—or presents himself as thinking—that Augustine's God gave the command as a "useless and arbitrary prohibition."[19] Beginning here, he reasons that it was unfair for God to give Adam and Eve an unintelligible rule: are not human beings the sort of creatures that resist rules they cannot understand? Given how understandable Adam's transgression was when viewed in this light, he concludes, calling it a crime is tantamount to punishing him for being himself. Augustine's God, Rousseau cleverly suggests, was setting Adam up for failure.

While, as we will see, Augustine thinks God's design was to cultivate trust in love, it is unclear how much of this emphasis would have come through in an Augustinianism stripped of its original exploratory quality. As Michael Moriarty has argued in *Fallen Nature, Fallen Selves*, Augustine's seventeenth-century followers focused less on expounding the psychology undergirding God's plan and more on proven doctrines. For them, Adam's punishment was the only logical—and pious—explanation of an established fact: human beings, even children, suffer.[20] In other words, Moriarty argues, the Port-Royale Augustinians reasoned from the "undeniable facts of human life" to the existence of Original Sin, deeming it impious to question the doctrine.[21] Translating Augustine's profound theology of divine love into a syllogistic argument, it is possible that the reason for God's "useless and arbitrary prohibition" may have been lost in the mix.

Regardless, Rousseau presents himself as puzzled by the ostensibly Augustinian reading and offers his own in its place. For Rousseau, God's command is best read as paternal advice to avoid a deadly fruit. This interpretation, he suggests, is much more in accord with "the idea one should have of God's goodness and even with the text of Genesis than the idea the Scholars are pleased to prescribe to us."[22] While we should perhaps be skeptical of Rousseau's apparent piety in this letter, I see no reason to suggest that Rousseau is not honest about his reservations about Augustinianism, his commitment to an authentic, personal, and rational reading of the Bible, or his sentiment that God must be good.[23] It is clear that he finds Augustinianism to be inhumane for

perpetuating the idea that God could have imposed such a terrible punishment on Adam. It is also clear that he wants anyone reading his letter to join him in his assessment. Writing at a high pitch, he exclaims that Adam's punishment is so terrible:

> It is even impossible to conceive of a more terrible one. For what other castigation could Adam have sustained for the greatest crimes other than being condemned to death, himself and all his race, in this world and to spend eternity in the other one consumed by the fires of hell? Is that the penalty imposed by the God of mercy on a poor wretch for letting himself be fooled? How I hate the disheartening doctrine of our harsh Theologians! If I were tempted for a moment to acknowledge it, that is when I would believe I were blaspheming![24]

For Rousseau, it seems, the Augustinian interpretation of first sin, which has influenced both Catholic and Protestant orthodoxies, is entirely opposed to the notion of a good God. It is unsurprising that he would take aim at it in his writings.

With this charge in the background, it is fitting to turn to Rousseau's *Second Discourse* in earnest. As suggested thus far, this discourse presents something of a fabular history designed to replace Augustine's account of the Fall. Here is what I mean: It is not that Rousseau disbelieves in the natural goodness of Man; as Arthur Melzer has compellingly argued, this conviction stands as the heart of Rousseau's system.[25] Rather, it is that Rousseau takes advantage of the way the discovery of the New World had affected the European imagination to enflesh the idea, giving it a backstory that people can latch onto. Recognizing the role of the imagination in the human psyche, Rousseau is aware of his own capacity to alter his readers' perceptions of how they came to be what they are—and thereby to alter how they understand themselves. By reconsidering what the first man must have been like, he brings to birth a historical consciousness in his readers, presenting a carefully crafted image of a progenitor who in every respect is the opposite

of Adam, both before and after his Fall. As Melzer puts it, "Rousseau completes the humanistic inversion, showing that the animal in man is in fact the angel in him. Evil exists not because of man's Fall from God . . . but because of his accidental 'rise from animality.'"[26]

Thus, while much scholarly attention has been focused on the ways Rousseau pushes back against Thomas Hobbes (and other moderns) in the *Second Discourse*, we can say with Melzer that if Hobbes views fallen nature *qua* Augustine as genuinely natural, Rousseau calls even this residue of the Augustinian worldview into question, radicalizing the modern subversion of the Augustinian paradigm to affirm man's goodness. Indeed, as Rousseau boldly writes in the *Exordium* preceding his discourse, if the discovery of primitive peoples in the New World had caused seventeenth-century philosophers to reconsider the state of nature, "none of them has reached it."[27] In saying this, Rousseau tantalizingly suggests that he has gotten behind the Augustinian convention in a way other philosophers could not, served, as he is, by his unique authenticity.

Asserting that his musings "ought not be taken for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings; better suited to elucidate the Nature of things than to show their genuine origin," he sidesteps the question of the anti-Augustinian implications of his account by acknowledging their fabular quality.[28] Having sealed off the realm of rational speculation from the guidance of revelation, he speaks as if his historical investigation is entirely innocuous: he will set aside "all the facts, for they do not affect the question."[29] Going on, he piously maintains that "religion commands us to believe that since God himself drew men out of the state of Nature immediately after the creation, they are unequal because he wanted them to be so."[30] Yet, he asserts, this does not prevent us from considering what humanity "might have become if it had remained abandoned to itself."[31] Having said this, he almost immediately shifts gears, excusing his subsequent bluntness by saying he will now speak in a mode

suitable for readers from all ages. Now he speaks no longer tentatively but in the affirmative:

> O Man, whatever Land you may be from, whatever may be your opinions, listen; Here is your history such as I believed I read it, not in the Books by your kind, who are liars, but in Nature which never lies. . . . The times of which I speak are very remote: How much you have changed from what you were! It is, so to speak, the life of your species that I will describe to you in terms of the qualities you received, which your education and your habits could deprave, but which they could not destroy.[32]

With this thinly veiled suggestion that Scripture—or at least, the scholarly books interpreting Scripture—is, like any cultural product, a liar, he turns his earlier framing on its head. Now he highlights the anti-Augustinian implications of his account and implies its veracity, which is corroborated by his unique attention to nature. In this way, Rousseau completes his framing of the *Second Discourse*, flagging what he will not explicitly point out in its pages.

Looking at the *Second Discourse* from a birds-eye view, three things are particularly notable. The first is that Rousseau presents his investigation in a scientific register. In this way, he taps into the authority of the new science, which was everywhere calling into question the old order. Throughout, he presents himself as knowledgeable about both ancient accounts of primitive man and recent testimonies from those who had visited the New World. The details from recent testimonies are clearly designed to help his investigation come across as authoritative, even if they paint a picture that is fundamentally the result of Rousseau's own thinking.[33] There is, for example, little empirical basis for the contention that the first man was quite solitary, as Rousseau suggests—and yet, this idea is central to the anthropology that Rousseau wants to put forward.[34]

The second notable aspect of Rousseau's framing of the *Second Discourse* is the way in which it provides a historical underpinning

to the cultural critique presented in the *First Discourse*. Rousseau's fable, in other words, corroborates and bolsters his association of society with artifice, and artifice with corruption. In this way, he takes a cultural critique that is in many ways Augustinian and links it to an explanatory account that undermines the Augustinian alternative. Augustine, in brief, thinks that fallen custom (*consuetudo*) exacerbates our enslavement to sin, and though he develops this idea into a robust cultural critique, he ultimately attributes fallen custom to *amor sui* (self-love), rather than vice versa. By casting our unhappy condition as, instead, a product of circumstance, Rousseau gives us an alternative genealogy of the depravity we see in ourselves and others. More than this, he sets the stage for a different approach to dealing with it. He introduces the possibility that we could fix human behavior through alternative social structures, something ruled out if the root problem is our fallen nature and its proneness to self-love.

Third and finally, by casting doubt on our ability to discover our true nature by considering what we are today—we have, after all, changed so very radically from what we once were—Rousseau creates a clean slate on which he can depict human nature anew. Undermining our ability to affirm or deny our past through introspection, he frees himself to portray human nature as he imagines it to be. Unsurprisingly, Rousseau ascribes different qualities to our nature than Augustine did. Notably, these are qualities not highly valued in the Augustinian picture but are integral to the political vision Rousseau wants to foster. At the heart of this picture, I argue, is autonomy.

What, then, is Rousseau's fable? It is, as noted, a construal of the first man stripped of all the "supernatural gifts he may have received and of all the artificial faculties he could have only acquired by prolonged progress."[35] Having sidestepped with this framing the theological and philosophical traditions of thinking about human nature, Rousseau pledges to show us the truth, wiping away all the artifice that has prevented us from seeing it thus far. With our interest piqued, he famously writes this of the first man: "I see him sating his hunger beneath an oak, slaking his

thirst at the first stream, finding his bed of the same tree that supplied his meal, and with that his needs are satisfied."[36] Natural man is simple, solitary, and satisfied.

Let us contrast this first glance of "natural man" with the Augustinian version—and here, we need not immediately distinguish between Augustine and his seventeenth-century followers. This "natural man" is, of course, none other than the biblical Adam, who is created with the "supernatural gifts" that Rousseau sets to the side. Here again we see his engagement with the seventeenth-century Augustinian tradition. For Augustinians like Jansen, what was important was countering the recent idea that there was such a thing as pure nature—a nature that had integrity apart from grace.[37] Augustine was helpful in making this case, given his emphasis on the necessity of grace for human happiness. In the Augustinian tradition, our nature is made in and for a grace that sustains it and elevates it, bringing it beyond what it is capable of by nature, in a way that not just completes our nature but also introduces something radically new: the fulfillment of our deepest desire. This bears out in Augustine's exegesis of the Genesis account.

Here, however, we would do well to return to Augustine's theology in earnest, as it provides a richer contrast with the Rousseauian vision than the Jansenist syllogism would reveal; it spells out precisely what is being denied by presenting our progenitors as simple, solitary, and satisfied. For Augustine, human beings exist with a kind of receptive integrity that thirsts for the love it is designed to receive: something the Genesis account of Adam and Eve also reveals.[38] In questioning why God deals with Adam the way He does, Augustine discovers a logic to God's design that teaches us about ourselves. We are, it turns out, complex—a mystery to ourselves, radically relational, and an abyss of longing for God.

Highlighting that God created a partner for Adam out of his own flesh, Augustine emphasizes the radical sociality of human beings. For Augustine, God's dealing with Adam is, from the beginning, pedagogical: "God's intention was that in this way the unity of

human society and the bonds of human sympathy be more emphatically brought home to men."[39] For Augustine, significantly, all humankind was created *in* Adam. Contrasting this beginning with that of "creatures of a solitary habit, who walk alone and love solitude," as well as those who are "gregarious," he concludes that God created the human species uniquely in one man to teach that human beings are "the most social of all creatures," created for a radical form of unity.[40] This vision of human sociality—and its spousal layering—is a claim that Rousseau clearly targets.[41] Perhaps it is worthwhile considering why.

For Augustine, what is so significant about our social nature is that it is radically tied up with our ultimate destiny. Indeed, although Adam and Eve are perfectly provided for in the Garden of Eden, in harmony with themselves and with God, Augustine already anticipates a destiny for them beyond the Garden, writing that "if they continued in perfect obedience, they would be granted the immortality of the angels and an eternity of bliss."[42] Later elaborating that this bliss is nothing other than the full and unending "enjoyment of God and of one another in God," Augustine highlights the shape of human desire in a way that explains Adam's restlessness.[43] In Augustine's view, Adam already points beyond himself to what he could be if he received what God wanted to give. In other words, he is, in a very different way than Rousseau meant, perfectible. Changing this meaning, Rousseau cuts off Augustinian teleology at the root.

More must be said here. For Augustine, human perfectibility is bound up with a view of freedom that is made to be exercised in *amor Dei*. Insisting that to become possible, beatitude—"the enjoyment of God and a mutual fellowship in God"—required a kind of trust on the part of Adam and Eve, Augustine teaches that human beings are teleologically oriented toward a mature form of love that goes beyond the state in which Adam and Eve were originally created.[44] Thus, unlike Rousseau, Augustine reads the prohibition on the eating of the fruit as God's way of inviting Adam and Eve into beatitude and not as a warning against a poisonous fruit, which would be theologically insignificant. While Rousseau is right

that Augustine thinks the fruit is, as far as Adam and Eve can tell, innocuous, for Augustine, the inscrutability of God's command serves an important function. By asking Adam and Eve to obey Him on a matter they cannot understand, God invites them to an act of radical trust that paradoxically opens up the possibility of a deeper participation in *amor Dei*.[45] Reading this command within a sacramental context, a context in which perfectibility is seen to *require* creaturely agency, it becomes clear that Augustine's logic is informed by the recognition that it is not possible to give humankind the gift of divine life without inviting Adam and Eve to freely enter into it. Love requires that Adam and Eve freely give themselves over to God.

This, as we all know, is not the way the story ends but is, instead, made up for in the fullness of time by the radical *kenosis* of Christ. Because Adam and Eve do not trust God in Genesis but are instead seduced by the snake's promise that they will be like gods if they eat of the tree, they are cast out of the Garden and required to fend for themselves. For Augustine, the only reason that Adam and Eve believe the snake's intimation that God is not for them but wishes to lord it over them is that in their hearts they had already fallen away from God, becoming self-pleasers, animated by *amor sui*. Writing that it was "in secret that the first human beings began to be evil," Augustine concludes, "this, then, is the original evil: man regards himself as his own light, and turns away from that light which would make man himself a light if he would set his heart on it."[46] *Amor sui*, in other words, is a refusal to participate in *amor Dei*.

Notably, this explanation is cast in terms made possible by a sacramental ontology. It is only by participating in *amor Dei* that human beings truly come to be like gods:

> [F]or created Gods are gods not in their own true nature but by participation in the true God. By aiming at more a man is diminished, when he elects to be self-sufficient and defects from the one who is really sufficient for him.[47]

Imagining that they could be like gods apart from God, however, Adam and Eve take their destiny into their own hands, rupturing their relationship with God as a result. For Augustine, therefore, the deepest irony of the Genesis story is that God always wanted to make Adam and Eve like himself.[48] The deepest desire that they acted on, albeit in a wrongful way, was already destined for fulfillment, but it could be fulfilled only through the act of radical trust in which they refused to live.

Returning to Rousseau, we see that the depiction of natural man as a creature who is so nearly a beast, who is alone, and who is above all satisfied in this state runs in direct opposition to the vision Augustine conceived.[49] Over and against a vision of the human person whose heart is restless because it longs for God, we have a satisfied and solitary primate whose natural desires are bodily and few:

> Wandering the forests without industry, without speech, without settled abode, without war, and without tie, without any need of others of his kind and without any desire to harm them, perhaps even without recognizing any one of them individually, subject to few passions and self-sufficient, savage man had only the sentiments and the enlightenment suited to this state, that he sensed only his true needs, looked only at what he believed it to be in his interest to see, and that his intelligence made no more progress than his vanity.[50]

By this radical recalibration of human nature, Rousseau deepens the anti-teleological thrust of modern anthropology, implying that restlessness should be read not as a longing for the divine but as a product of infectious social ideas. More than this, by situating natural man in an era so very distant from our own, he shakes our confidence in our ability to speak truly about our nature; anything that once seemed uniquely human could well be a social construct. Recasting perfectibility as a kind of adaptivity that mimics nonnatural behaviors is simply the nail in the coffin.

Indeed, by presenting rationality itself as something historically conditioned—perhaps a product of our perfectibility—Rousseau gives a framework in which it is difficult to imagine how the first man could have been capable of the level of moral decision-making that Genesis attributes to him.[51] Taking advantage of the place primitive man had acquired in the eighteenth-century European imagination, Rousseau propels his readers even farther back into history, using the principle that our species must have developed over time to reason about what must have taken place. Drawing, for example, on testimonies that some savages could not count up to 5, or speculating that prelinguistic beasts like the Pongos or Orang-Outangs might in fact belong to the human species, Rousseau raises the possibility that rationality might be less central to our nature than we usually imagine.[52] With this, he casts the Genesis account as an ahistorical fable designed to tell us something about what we are, not to provide a genealogy of how we came to be what we are.

In fact, in his letter to Christophe de Beaumont, Rousseau makes this precise argument. Alleging that the Doctrine of Original Sin "explains everything except its own principle," he maintains that it is precisely this principle that has to be explained.[53] Having been attacked by Archbishop de Beaumont with the claim that he is undermining the very principle that lets us know the mystery of our own hearts, Rousseau replies:

> [Y]ou do not see that this principle, far more universal, illumines even the fault of the first man, which yours leaves in obscurity. The only thing you can see is man in the hands of the Devil, while I see how he fell into them. The cause of evil, according to you, is corrupted nature, and this corruption itself is an evil whose cause had to be sought. Man was created good. We both agree on that, I believe. But you say he is wicked because he was wicked. And I show how he was wicked. Which of us, in your opinion, better ascends to the principle?[54]

Arguing that his writings alone show how man became wicked by providing a "genealogy" of how we came to be what we are, Rousseau asserts the superiority of his own principle.[55] Moreover, by presenting the Augustinian interpretation of Scripture as an assertion without a foundation, he maintains that the Doctrine of Original Sin can tell us little about how we came to be what we are, and he turns instead to empirical inquiry, human reasoning, and authentic introspection to reconstruct what must have taken place.[56]

Here, finally, is where we get to the role that *amour de soi-même* and *amour-propre* play in dislodging the authority of an account that contrasts *amor sui* with *amor Dei*. Whereas for Augustine it is Adam's turn away from God, his *amor sui*, that causes the Fall, for Rousseau it is natural man's emergence from the state of nature that occasions the development of *amour-propre.* Indeed, Rousseau's natural man does not, properly speaking, fall from the state of nature but emerges from it almost by accident.[57] While his natural man is solitary, bumping into other members of his species with little consequence for his inner life, Rousseau speculates that it is only when natural man realizes that it is useful to cooperate with other members of his species that they begin to live together. Belaboring the point that this insight took an incredibly long time to develop in the primitive mind, he reasons that primitive humans began to live together only after they perceived the same talent for ingenuity in fellow members of their species as they found in themselves.[58] Realizing that it was useful to collaborate as a result, they eventually grew used to doing so and found it more convenient to live together. To this discovery, both accidental and inevitable, Rousseau attributes the eventual development of language, and even human affection. Love, strikingly, is not natural.

Tarrying on what followed, a time that he describes as the "happiest and the most lasting epoch" in human history, Rousseau paints a picture of a primitive society that invites the nostalgia for pastoral simplicity that Kelly identifies with Rousseau's other moral fables.[59] For our purposes, though, what matters most about

Rousseau's description of this era is how it fits in his genealogy of *amour-propre*. As he explains in his famous Note XV, *amour propre* should not be confused with *amour de soi-même*. While, he maintains, *amour de soi-même* is a natural sentiment tantamount to the desire for self-preservation, *amour propre* is what he calls "a relative sentiment," which is "factitious" and "born in society."[60] Imagining its genesis, he conjectures that at some point it must have become customary for primitive communities to gather for song and dance. Without putting too much stock in the exact event that led to *amour propre*, he speculates that the moment the best singer or dancer came to be admired by the others was the very kind of moment that caused the idea of consideration to take shape in the human mind. Rousseau's point is as follows: Without living together, it would have been impossible for human beings to desire others' recognition. This desire is not, therefore, natural because it is elicited by society. Its emergence is contingent on an accident. Important to note is that it also makes human beings dependent on one another. With its advent, they are no longer self-sufficient.

Worse, Rousseau argues, once human beings see the attractiveness of being appreciated in the eyes of others, they take "their first step" toward "inequality and vice."[61] Giving a plausible account of how the innovations achieved by working together tied primitive humans in stronger bonds of dependence, he overlays on this the problems that accrue with the expansion of *amour propre* and the new desires that follow in its wake. Developing the critique of his *First Discourse*, he documents the rise of the "ardor to be talked about" and the "frenzy to achieve distinction" that "keeps us outside ourselves."[62] While these are phenomena Augustine laments in his own writings, Rousseau's uprooting of the Genesis account unmoors the explanation Augustine gives for them, offering a new one in its place. *Amor sui* is exchanged for *amour propre*.

Rousseau, in other words, gives a radically new genealogy of the forms of self-love that plague our souls and our culture, thereby dispensing with the theological infrastructure undergirding the Augustinian account of the Fall. Here, there is no choice; no radical and dramatic act of self-love cementing our future as a fallen

people and explaining our current state. If *amor sui* were the problem, *amor Dei* would be the solution. Instead, the permutation of self-love is the unfortunate result of circumstance, a slow drip toward a state of enslavement that contradicts our nature. Society breeds *amour propre* and alienates us from ourselves, making us unfree and unnatural. It also breeds social inequality, as the rich value what they enjoy "only to the extent that others are deprived of [it]."[63] *This is the problem*. To see this more clearly, it is perhaps helpful to note the genealogy of Rousseau's distinction.

As Jean Lafond has demonstrated, the distinction between *amour de soi-même* and *amour propre* first came to the fore in France in seventeenth-century debates between the Christian humanists and the Augustinians—specifically, the Jesuits and the Jansenists—about whether man could be good without acting out of charity.[64] For Christian humanists, the rediscovery of the classical idea that man can will his own good, without knowing God, meant that one could speak of a natural form of self-love that was quite distinct from the vicious forms of self-love Augustine critiqued. Calling the former *amour de soi-même*, and the latter *amour propre*, Christian humanists argued that *amour propre* was a distortion of our God-given desire to look after ourselves: a misunderstanding of our very nature. In response to this new emphasis on the part of Christian humanists, the Augustinians of Port-Royale denied the distinction, reiterating Augustine's own categorization of *amor sui* as an explicit rejection of *amor Dei*.[65] In brief, the Jansenists emphasized the depravity of fallen nature and argued that without *amor Dei*, human beings could not become good, whereas the Jesuits highlighted the goodness of our nature. Thus, in this debate, the question of whether it was possible to talk about a healthy self-love turned on the question of whether the Augustinian paradigm precluded the possibility *tout court*.[66]

What is most notable about this debate, for our purposes, is the way it has become evacuated from the sacramental context of Augustine's original arguments. Although the Jansenists echo Augustine in suggesting that pagan virtue was always and everywhere false virtue, they jettison the participatory model that

complicates Augustine's assertion. For Augustine, created nature does have an intrinsic dynamism that propels it toward its own *telos*; the fact that human beings are created to receive and participate in a special way in the love of God (*amor Dei*) does not mean that the natural inclination to wish for one's own good disappears after the Fall. Rather, Augustine thinks, human nature bears witness to its intrinsic wish to be brought back into harmonious relationship with God, such that we see intimations of this wish in all kinds of human behavior. Maintaining, however, that we often see the signs of selfishness in the very same behavior, he views pagan virtue as at once pointing beyond itself and groaning for its own perfection, and clinging to its own independence in pride. Thus, I suggest, Augustine would affirm the idea of a natural *amour de soi-même* even as he would view it as leading human beings toward *amor Dei* as its own foundation and fulfillment. *Amour de soi-même* is meant to be incorporated into *amor Dei*; if it is not, it will become *amor sui* or *amour propre*.

Having made this aside, it is at least clear that Rousseau's presentation of *amour de soi-même* as natural and *amour propre* as vicious places him squarely in the anti-Augustinian camp, as it was construed in the seventeenth century. Yet, going beyond the Christian humanists, who were, in some sense, in harmony with the fifth-century Augustine, Rousseau denies the Doctrine of the Fall completely, presenting *amour propre* as a social construct. Telling Archbishop de Beamont that the fundamental moral principle at the heart of his writings is that "man is a naturally good being, loving justice and order; that there is no original perversity in the human heart, and that the first movements of nature are always right," he links this principle with his contention that "the only passion born with man, namely love of self [*amour de soi-même*], is a passion in itself indifferent to good and evil; that it becomes good or bad only by accident and depending on the circumstances in which it develops."[67] We can see, easily enough, how the *Second Discourse* fits into this project.

So, we might ask, what are the political upshots of Rousseau's anti-Augustinian fable? I think the most significant upshot is the

way it recalibrates its readers' sense of their own culpability and desserts. If, in the Augustinian view, we all sinned in Adam, it is reasonable to view the suffering of our current state as a punishment for sin.[68] Indeed, under certain versions of the Augustinian paradigm, social structures were seen as divinely ordained simply because they existed.[69] If God is providential, the reasoning went, then it is God who chooses who is in a position of servitude and who is in a position of power. It is proud—bad—to rebel. Indeed, within the Augustinian paradigm, rebellion is the mark of the Devil: the unwarranted lunge for an illusory freedom that undermines our genuine good.[70] While for Augustine this vignette is held in place by his *amor sui*, *amor Dei* distinction, it easy to see how this can become a political theology—that is, a parodic theology used to justify political practices.[71]

Notably, Rousseau's fable tackles these ossifications and distortions of Augustine's actual thought in significant ways. By presenting law as a ruse foisted by the property owners, Rousseau invites his readers to be skeptical of the "powers that be" and the social structures ostensibly in place for the people's own good. What is more, by suggesting that dependence is not only unnatural but also the cause of all our unhappiness, Rousseau prepares us to see a new form of freedom at the heart of human nature, a freedom neither celebrated nor discussed by Augustine.[72] Finally, by suggesting that we have been patterned by society in such a way that we no longer know what we are, Rousseau introduces the idea of false consciousness, creating a wedge between our interpretation of our desires and what they must really be. By shifting the blame from ourselves to the society that has made us what we are, Rousseau makes us cognizant of the ways others have unknowingly oppressed us and filled us with desires that have made us unhappy. Depicting his readers as victims of circumstances counters the idea that his readers are somehow deserving of the fate society has handed them. In this way, he thinks, he ennobles them.[73]

Yet, as suggested at the outset of this article, in defending humankind against the Augustinian specter, Rousseau has perhaps been forced into an unnecessary choice—and for this, perhaps the

Jansenists, in their anti-sacramental Augustinianism, are partly responsible. If the Jansenists begin their discussion of the Fall by positing the Doctrine of Original Sin, all that preceded and informed it becomes lost. Lamenting their attempt to arrange Augustine's thought into a logical system, such that its *sacramental principle* could no longer be seen, Maurice Blondel writes the following:

> Under the pretext of restoring the authentic teaching of their preferred teacher, St. Augustine, haven't they also applied a hermeneutic that is totally contrary to his spirit? Who is this great Doctor of Grace, really? His was a life full of contrasts, totally malleable; he would throw out the most provocative theses, in the most outlandish formulations: but we shouldn't therefore imagine him in the dress of a pedant with rigid pleats. He was always ready for caveats and retractions. . . . If we apply to such a man, to such a thought, to such a style, a didactic method of formulas pinned together and formal syllogisms based on mummified texts, then under the guise of literal fidelity, the false meaning is perpetuated and canonized.[74]

Rather than recovering the sacramental worldview that held Augustine's reflections together, the Jansenists and those like them mummified his ideas, ignoring both their rhetorical context and the sacramental vision undergirding them.[75] And yet, as a ressourcement thinker, Blondel participated in the exciting work of recovering them.

For political theorists, the insight of ressourcement Augustinians like Henri de Lubac, Erich Przywara, Joseph Ratzinger, and Maurice Blondel warrants notice, precisely because of the political vision it can ground. In reviving the sacramental principle, these thinkers remind us that Augustine does not oppose divine activity to human freedom, or grace to nature. Instead, he sees God at work in the world, partly because human beings are genuine agents who can truly participate in *amor Dei*. Indeed, it is precisely

because Augustine is so enlivened by the possibility of participating in God's work *as a creature* that he uses his rhetorical gifts to move the hearts of his audience to the love of God. And yet, it is because he is also equally aware of the creaturely capacity to say no—to root ourselves in ourselves and distort this mission—that he so often returns to the story of the Fall as a touchstone. For Augustine, we are deeply capable of forgetting our divine calling and choosing a *simulacrum* in its stead. In reminding human beings of the shape of our freedom, Augustine does not prime us for obedience to human masters but instead unmasks vicious claims to mastery. If our actions can be joined to the very action of God, if we but root them in *amor Dei*, we are empowered to work for the good in any and all circumstances.

What, then, would Augustine's sacramental view mean for politics?[76] It would mean that freedom is teleologically ordered toward self-gift, such that all positions of power are invitations to service. It would also mean admitting that human life is often a mark of people abusing the gift of freedom to dominate others. By carving out a mode of living in the world that each of his readers can take on, Augustine hopes to draw more and more people into the sacramental life of living in *amor Dei*. While he does not think that a perfect politics is possible as long as human beings tend toward *amor sui*, he does think that *amor Dei* is always on offer to human beings and that this is the best path to cultural renewal that he can offer.

In sum, that the sacramental principle had been lost in the seventeenth-century debate over Augustine meant its participants had few resources to talk about the human capacity to cooperate with (or reject) the divine plan. Forced into a choice between divine power and human freedom, their debate set the stage for a wholehearted rejection of the God of arbitrary grace. For the recipients of this heritage, the recovery of Augustine's sacramental vision, which affirms both primary and secondary causality, would open up a way of talking about human freedom and dependence together, allowing us to parse out the difference between those customs in harmony with *amor Dei* and those distorted by *amor*

sui, and to respond accordingly. In this way, Augustine's sacramental vision stands as a fruitful foundation, not for an anemic politics of acquiescence but for a robust politics of service.

Notes

1. It is significant that Augustine does not view love of God simply as our love for God but rather as God's love in which we participate through the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.
2. I am not aware of any other scholarship specifically exploring the relationship between Augustine and the *Second Discourse*. Thus far, scholarship focusing on Rousseau's reception of Augustine has focused on Rousseau's *Confesssions*. See, e.g., Ann Hartle, *The Modern Self in Rousseau's Confessions. A Reply to St. Augustine* (Indianapolis, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983); P. J. Archambault, "Rousseau's Tactical (Mis)Reading of Augustine," *Symposium* 41 (1987): 6–12; Matt Qvortrup, "Rousseau, Jean-Jacques," in *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine*, ed. Karla Pollman and Willemein Otten (Oxford: University Press, 2013), https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199299164.001.0001/acref-9780199299164-e-583; and Wing Kwan Lam, "Rethinking the Source of Evil in Rousseau's *Confessions*," *The Rousseauian Mind*, ed. Christopher Kelly and Eve Grace (New York: Routledge, 2019), 34–43. For a general treatment of Rousseau's reception of Augustine's political thought, see Christopher Brooke, "Rousseau's Political Philosophy: Stoic and Augustinian Influences," in *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau*, ed. Patrick Riley (New York: Cambridge, 2001), 94–123.
3. For an in-depth look at this phenomenon, see Henri de Lubac, *Augustinisme et Théologie Moderne* (Paris: Aubier, 1965). In it, de Lubac makes the convincing case that Michael Baius and Cornelius Jansenius are not faithful to the spirit of Augustine's writings, only to the letter. He focuses on what is lost when they attempt to systematize his insights.
4. Cf. Jean Lafond, "Avatars de l'humanisme chrétien (1590–1710): Amour de soi et amour propre," *L'Homme et Son Image*, 423–40, 433.
5. John Henry Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 118. For a recent exploration of the sacramental principle and its implications for the history of philosophy, see Jonathan Martin Ciraulo, "The Sacramental Principle"; he describes the sacramental principle as an "intellectual commitment regarding the interpenetration and cooperation of matter and spirit." *Communio* 50, no. 1 (2023): 67–111.

6. In "Augustine and the Modern World," Erich Przywara argues that what was united in Augustine's thought is bifurcated into two in modernity, with one track leading to Hegel, the other to Kierkegaard. See Erich Przywara, "Augustine and the Modern World," in *Saint Augustine: His Age, Life, and Thought*, trans. E. I. Watkins, ed. Martin D'Arcy (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), 249–86.
7. I am in no way arguing that this is all the *Second Discourse* is; rather, I maintain that this is an element of the piece that has not been thoroughly worked out in the scholarship.
8. I wonder whether Rousseau cobbled together a version of Christianity with the help of thinkers like Nicolas Malebranche. Malebranche thought the created order had general laws through which God governed the universe. He rejected the idea of particular providence and argued that God operated always through the simplest means. I think Rousseau takes up these last ideas. Interesting is that Malebranche is also deeply anti-sacramental, in that his view of the natural world is mechanistic even as he maintains that God does everything. In other words, he is an occasionalist. Cf. Patrick Riley, *The General Will before Rousseau* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 191.
9. For a treatment of the sacramental nature of Augustine's view of politics, see Veronica Roberts Ogle, *Politics and the Earthly City in Augustine's City of God* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
10. Christopher Kelly, *Rousseau's Exemplary Life: The Confessions as Political Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 27.
11. Ibid., 18.
12. Ibid., 15, quoting Rousseau, *Emile*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 156.
13. Cf. Arthur Melzer, *The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 272–74. Melzer provocatively argues the reason Rousseau let his works be published more broadly is that he was so pessimistic that anything could be done to ameliorate decadent monarchic Europe that it would not matter.
14. Riley, *The General Will before Rousseau*, 187–90.
15. As Riley explains, the pronouncement was the result of a great quarrel in Geneva, instigated by the "theological innovations of a newly arrived Cartesian philosopher," which resulted in a reaffirmation of traditional Calvinist teachings that Christ did not die for all and that God does not will to save everyone" (ibid., 189).

16. Calvin argued that the notion of irresistible grace was actually to be found in Augustine, though he did not use the term. This is much contested. For a contemporary study of Augustine's varied ideas on the complex relationship between grace and free will, see Han-Luen Kantzer Komline, *Augustine on the Will: A Theological Account* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). Although her account is nuanced, she does maintain that Augustine affirmed the will's receptive agency despite recognizing that after the Pelagian controversy, he increasingly emphasizes the primary role of divine grace in rectifying human willing.
17. These debates are, in fact, complicated, with some suggesting that J. F. Jansen and John Calvin shared similar views about grace despite terminological differences, others maintaining that they held substantive disagreements. However, at the risk of oversimplifying, both the Calvinists and the Jansenists had the reputation of teaching that all interior grace was efficacious, or irresistible, and that God was justified in giving this grace only to those He favored with His inscrutable will. For a helpful summary of seventeenth-century debates about grace, see Riley, *The General Will before Rousseau*, chap. 1.
18. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written from the Mountain, and Related Writings*, trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith Bush, ed. Eve Grace and Christopher Kelly (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001), 29.
19. Rousseau, *Letter to Beaumont*, 29.
20. See Michael Moriarty's treatment of the seventeenth-century reception of Augustine's teaching for more on its "syllogistic" approach in *Fallen Nature, Fallen Selves II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 103–6.
21. Ibid., 106. This is, in particular, a result of their desire to counter the idea of a "pure nature," which had come up through the tradition. De Lubac gives a thorough explanation of the historical development of this idea in *Augustinianism and Modern Theology*.
22. Ibid. On Augustine's account, God's warning not to eat of the fruit of the tree, lest Adam and Eve die, foreshadows the death of the soul that follows from the decision to betray God. He interprets God's question "where are you, Adam?" as God telling Adam that he had separated himself from God, such that his soul was "bereft of God" (Augustine, *City of God*, 13.12, 522). God, Augustine explains, was "rebuking Adam; and by the form of the rebuke he was warning him to take notice where he was, in that God was not with him" (Ibid., 13.15, 524).
23. Cf. Christopher Kelly, introduction to Rousseau, *Letter to Beaumont*, xviii.

24. Ibid.
25. Melzer, *The Natural Goodness of Man*.
26. Ibid., 286.
27. Rousseau, *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 132.
28. Ibid. It is significant that this was a known justificatory prelude to early speculations about "pure nature": what our nature would have been without grace and without the Fall. See, e.g., de Lubac on Soto in *Augustinianism and Modern Theology*, 120.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. This precisely the speculative move that originally generated the idea of pure nature. I do not think this is accidental.
32. Ibid., 133.
33. I thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing out that Rousseau does allude early in the text to Descartes's claim in *Discourse on Method* that hypothetical and conditional reasoning can help clarify the nature of things, even if they do not literally show their genuine origin. In this way, Rousseau seems less concerned with the project of making a true account of beginnings than with showing human nature anew.
34. One can also point to Rousseau's *Letter to Malesherbes*, dated January 12, 1762, where he describes his enlightenment on the way to Vincennes, for clues about Rousseau's intentions in writing the *Second Discourse*.
35. Ibid., 134.
36. Ibid.
37. In reappropriating Augustine for his own age, Jansen was particularly interested in stressing this point, perhaps to the detriment of other facets of Augustine's theological vision.
38. Consider, e.g., the way in which Adam's take begins with the naming of the animals. In finding himself dissatisfied by not finding a partner, Adam is strikingly neither solitary nor satisfied. Hardly simple either, he stands apart from the animals from the beginning, both in the longings of his heart and in the fact that he is a question to himself because of them. This theme of Adam's unfinishedness is at the heart of Augustine's theological account; for Augustine, it is a theme that will link his very beginnings to his ultimate destiny.
39. Augustine, *City of God*, 12.22, 502.
40. Ibid. Cf. 14.1. It is worth noting that Augustine thinks that we were all created in Adam; this allows him to suggest that we all, in a sense, sinned in Adam, so it is not merely a vision in which Adam's progeny bear the

guilt of the father through no fault of their own. Cf. ibid., 13.14; and Augustine, *On Genesis*, trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City Press, 2002), *Gen. Lit.* VI.16, 310.

41. God creates Adam in a state of longing so that he may wish for Eve before he receives her; and in receiving her from his very self, he learns of the radical union for which their relationship is destined. This is to be contrasted with Rousseau's natural man, who has no spousal desire but, at most, sexual desire.
42. Ibid., 13.1, 51.
43. Crucially, in Augustine's vision, Adam and Eve are still in a state of bliss while in paradise. Therefore, this restless desire does not manifest in the same sort of way that it does in the fallen self. Cf. ibid., 14.10.
44. Ibid., 19.13.
45. Augustine writes that if they had remained obedient to God, they would have been able to be like gods.
46. Ibid., 14.13, 573.
47. Ibid.
48. Cf. ibid.
49. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 155.
50. Ibid., 157. As Christophe Litwin writes, "La bonté naturelle se caractérise avant tout comme un équlibre entre la puissance et le désir d'un être qui s'aime, et l'altération de la bonté naturelle de l'homme est un dérèglement de ce rapport qui, avec la mise en branle des facultés imaginatives, ouvre, en bien ou en mal, l'horizon des possibles et produit notre misère lorsque le rapport ne retrouve pas sa proportion." Christophe Litwin, "La Théorie De L'homme Entendue Comme Généalogie Morale," in *Penser l'homme: Treize etudes sur Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. Claude Habib and Pierre Manent (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2013), 55–69, 64.
51. In the letter to Christophe de Beaumont, he writes that "it is a demonstrated impossibility" that a savage "could ever raise his reflections up to the knowledge of the true God" (39).
52. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, Note XIV, 217–18.
53. Rousseau, *Letter to Beaumont*, 28. Again, it is possible that the theological reasons behind the Doctrine of Original Sin had been lost to Rousseau or it is, at least, more difficult to get at behind the emphases of the era.
54. Ibid., 31.
55. Ibid.
56. Notably, this is an account in which the historical evidence seems to be at odds with the Augustinian interpretation of what we once must have been.

57. Unlike what we see in Hobbes, Rousseau's man emerges from this state before the creation of society and law. Moreover, in Rousseau nascent society is presented not as the antidote to the state of nature but as a ruse by those who want to cement their own positions. Cf. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 173.
58. He notes that the first inking of pride in primitive man was in his recognition of his own superiority to other animals. Cf. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 162.
59. Ibid., 167. Richard Velkley has argued that this is in fact the era that Rousseau most wants to turn his readers' attention toward in nostalgia. He writes, "[T]he ideas of the completely free, unreflective, natural origin is beneficial *doxa*, . . . an alluring artiface or myth, necessary for philosophical liberation" but "only a moment of a dialectical ascent toward insight into the inevitability of reflection." Richard Velkley, "Speech, Imagination, Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal," in *Being after Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in Question* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 161n9.
60. Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 167
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 184.
63. Ibid.
64. Lafond, "Avatars de l'humanisme chretien (1590–1710)." Cf. Christophe Litwin, "Amour de soi," in *Passions Morales*, ed. Gloria Origgi, (PUF, 2019), 43–48, 43.
65. Cf. Christopher Brooke, *Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 76–100.
66. Showing that Rousseau encountered this debate and the distinction between *amour de soi-même* and *amour propre* through Jacques Abbadie, a Protestant theologian who viewed *amour propre* as a corruption of the natural and legitimate passion of *amour de soi-même*, Litwin argues that where Rousseau is truly unique is in his willingness to explicitly side with Pelagius and to deny the Doctrine of Original Sin entirely. Litwin, "Amour de soi," 43–45.
67. Rousseau, *Letter to Beaumont*, 28.
68. Augustine explains this in the following way: "[W]e were all in that one man, seeing that we all *were* that one man who fell into sin. . . . We did not yet possess forms individually created and assigned to us for us to live in them as individuals; but there already existed the seminal nature from which we were to be begotten." *City of God*, 13.14, 523.What this

means is much debated, but suffice it to say that the seventeenth-century Jansenists followed a physicalist interpretation of what it was purported to mean.

69. For this kind of Augustinianism, see, e.g., Geoffrey W. H. Lampe, "St. Augustine's Theory of Kingship," *Theology* 36, no. 212 (1938): 102–6.
70. Cf. ibid., 11.13, 445.
71. In her recent book, Mary Keys rightly points out that humility toward God liberates human beings from the pressures of false humility in politics. Mary M. Keys, *Pride, Politics and Humility in Augustine's "City of God"* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 90. Cf. *City of God*, 10.4, where Augustine writes that many terms of honor, rightly directed toward God, are misdirected toward human beings, a result of either excessive humility or destructive flattery.
72. "[This was] the moment one man needed the help of another; as soon as it was found to be useful for one to have provisions for two, equality disappeared, property appeared, work became necessary, and the vast forests changed into smiling Fields that had to be watered with the sweat of men, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to sprout and grow together with the harvests." Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, 167.
73. Melzer argues that Rousseau thinks this liberation can at least allow his readers to become aware of the struggle with artificial desire and to return to themselves in some way. Cf. Melzer, *The Natural Goodness of Man*, 66–67.
74. Maurice Blondel, "Le Jansénisme et l'anti-Jansénisme de Pascal," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 30, no. 2 (1923): 129–63, 136–37. "Sous prétexte de restituer l'authentique enseignement du Maître préféré, de Saint Augustin, ne va-t-on pas ainsi lui appliquer une herméneutique toute contraire à son esprit? Qu'est-il, en effet, ce grand Docteur de la Grâce? une vie, une vie pleine de contrastes, et toute plastique, qui, tour à tour, se jette aux thèses les plus provocantes, aux formules les plus outrancières: ne l'imaginons donc pas avec une « robe de pédant », aux plis rigides: il est toujours prêt aux compensations et aux « rétractations ». . . . Qu'on applique à un tel homme, à une telle pensée, à un tel style une méthode didactique de formules épinglées et de syllogismes en forme à partir de textes momifiés: alors, sous des apparences de fidélité littérale, c'est le faux sens perpétuel et canonisé." (English translation mine).
75. In his introduction to *Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written from the Mountain, and Related Writings,* Kelly writes that for Rousseau, "[m]etaphysics no longer supports morality but is supported by it, or

rather, at most, they prop up one another," noting that this is also one of the themes of the *Letter to Voltaire, Collected Writing*, 3:108–121. (xxi, 316).

76. This is the argument of *Politics and the Earthly City in Augustine's "City of God."* For a brief summary of this argument, see Veronica Roberts Ogle, "Healing Hope: A Response to Peter Kaufman," *Augustinian Studies* 53, no. 1 (2022): 47–50.