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The Roots of "Authentic Democracy": Christian Political Thought in the Walgreen Foundation Lectures

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Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the basis of a correct conception of the human person.

Pope John Paul II

The political implications of Christian belief and practice in the pluralistic and fractured republic of the United States are the subject of considerable debate in scholarship and the public square. Should Christian believers seek political power to reorient society toward truth and the common good or focus on building counter-*poleis*, preserving socially embodied witness to the truth of the gospel in localized communities? Theoretically, is Christianity a friend, foe, or essential scaffolding of liberal democracy? The

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Walgreen Foundation Lectures, particularly those of several Christian political philosophers and theorists in the 1940s and 1950s that formed the basis for monographs, constitute one locus of intellectual activity relevant to these questions. These scholars, three of them among the European émigrés who made notable contributions to political theory in the twentieth century, delivered lectures on the theoretical, moral, and spiritual foundations of politics and American democracy under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions.[1] Conscious of the Weimar Republic's descent into totalitarian dictatorship and the rise of Soviet communism, they saw the possibility of parallel developments in established democracies and the need for a theoretical defense of and vision for constitutional democracy. They argued that constitutional democracy rests on classical Christian premises about human nature and society as expressed in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, advancing a project that political scientist Francis D. Wormuth—a critic—termed "Walgreen political science."[2]

The Walgreen political scientist insists that freedom and authority, or freedom and truth, go together, rather than being opposed.[3] Rather than understanding democracy as simply government by majority or rule of the many, they present constitutional democracy as a form of Aristotelian "polity": rule of the many in the common interest.[4] In this view, constitutional democracy is a form of government dedicated to liberty, limited by the rule of law, and oriented toward the common good. The Christian church features prominently in Walgreen political science. A proper defense of democracy recognizes the important but limited role of the state in securing the common good, constrained by a higher law represented by the Christian church. Such a defense recognizes the metaphysical and theological sources of the "profound, inherent, and equal dignity" of each human being.[5] The church's existence and mission limit the purview of the state, recognizing the distinction between the temporal and spiritual spheres. The church proclaims a gospel affirming both human sinfulness and the significant worth of the human person. An institution whose authority comes not from consent of the governed but from God, whose teachings provide the theological

and spiritual foundations for authentic democracy while constraining democratic institutions to respect a higher law, the church is central to the Walgreen theists' vision.

The goal of this article is to recover and critically analyze this attempt to ground democratic theory in Christian philosophical anthropology. This exposition highlights anticipations of contemporary postliberal thought, including arguments for basing political institutions on a Christian anthropology and recognizing the common good as the goal and standard of public policy, and also notes the Walgreen theorists' attention to the need for institutional restraints on political power, based on Christian anthropological premises. After outlining the main ideas of the Walgreen lecturers, this study considers and offers responses to criticisms from both a positivist or relativist perspective and a religious perspective, criticisms with echoes in contemporary debates on Christianity and religion in politics. These critiques amount to a shared claim about the incompatibility of beliefs held to be certain truths and political freedom. Finally, the article reflects on the prospects for Walgreen political science in contemporary context, focusing on the idea of the Christian church as an authoritative institution in the context of a pluralist democracy, a notable component of the theory requiring amplification and development.

Walgreen political science offers raw material that could help Christian political theorists develop an alternative to both contractarian liberalism and contemporary postliberal thought. The works of the Walgreen theists offer resources for reconciling the American political inheritance with a Christian picture of the human person, recovering the best of those resources, and pursuing a public philosophy supporting institutions necessary to preserve human dignity; those resources require adaptation to the context of post-Christian America.

Situating the Walgreen Foundation Lectures

A remarkable number of significant contributions to postwar political theory and philosophy originated as lectures in the Walgreen Foundation Lectures, including Leo Strauss's *Natural Right and*

History (1953), Robert Dahl's *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (1956), and Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* (1958). The origins of the Walgreen Lectures predate World War II and reportedly relate to Charles R. Walgreen's concern with alleged communist indoctrination of his daughter rather than the postwar situation. Scholars and analysts have discussed the lecture series and the Walgreen Foundation in connection with the origins of the Chicago school of economics.[6] There is not much indication that either Mr. Walgreen or his son, Charles R. Walgreen Jr., who assumed leadership of the foundation after his father's death in 1935, had any particular interest in a focus on religion or Christianity; the foundation's executive secretaries largely determined the specific lecture topics and speakers, prior to its transfer to the Graduate School of Business under the direction of economist George Stigler in 1955.[7]

To be sure, the lecture series included numerous topics and speakers broadly relevant to American institutions, values, and public life.[8] Notably for our purposes, though, under the chairmanship of political science professor Jerome G. Kerwin, a number of lecturers contributed to Christian political thought in the postwar period. Jacques Maritain's *Man and the State* (1951) and Eric Voegelin's *New Science of Politics* (1952), both celebrated works, originated as lectures for this series. Yves Simon's *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (1951) and John Hallowell's *The Moral Foundation of Democracy* (1954) likewise originated as lectures in this series. All these Walgreen theists sought to apply Neo-Thomist philosophical principles to political science and government to defend and reinvigorate twentieth-century constitutional democracy.[9] In the foreword to Hallowell's *The Moral Foundation of Democracy*, Kerwin describes a "resurgence" of "the realists, the traditionalists, the Aristotelians, or the neo-scholastics—whatever name they choose to be known by," promoting "the ancient conviction that morals, in the sense of the choice of the right means . . . to rationally determined objective ends, lie at the very foundation of politics."[10]

These thinkers' works addressed a common intellectual foe: positivism as applied to legal and political science.[11] The Walgreen

theists attributed the demise of the Weimar Republic to the pervasive acceptance of legal positivism, which they also associate with moral relativism.[12] Some indeed claimed that the cause of political absolutism in the fascist and communist regimes was moral absolutism, and the best remedy was moral relativism. The Walgreen theists vehemently disagreed. Rather, they argued, the proper foundations of democracy rest on immutable truths about human nature and political order, ultimately traceable to divine ordination. Their works spoke both to public philosophy and to the disciplines of political science and political theory, arguing for a drastic reorientation in both spheres, incorporating metaphysical speculation and attention to final causation to the purpose of politics. Prominent jurist and legal philosopher Hans Kelsen also delivered a series of lectures eventually composing a lengthy article responding to Voegelin, Hallowell, and Maritain, along with the Protestant theologians Reinhold Niebuhr and Emil Brunner; hence, the Walgreen Lectures preserve a record of a robust exchange on the essence of democracy and its metaphysical foundations.[13]

While similarly dedicated to shoring up the legitimacy and healthy functioning of constitutional democracy, Walgreen theists present a stark alternative to John Rawls's public reason liberalism. Rather than grounding basic political institutions in an "overlapping consensus" comprising the foundational values that different religious and philosophical groups happen to share, the Walgreen theists argued that political institutions rest on basic philosophical premises about the nature and meaning of human life.[14] Constitutional democracy's institutions rest on anthropological premises drawn from the classical and Christian philosophical traditions, especially the work of St. Thomas Aquinas. While Maritain does argue that something like an overlapping consensus can be reached with regard to practical principles of democracy, resting on differing philosophical foundations, he notes that the truest foundations of democracy and human rights are found in Christian teaching.[15] An alternative to public reason liberalism, the project anticipates themes in contemporary postliberal analysis such as emphasis on the common good and the primacy of the

spiritual. Nevertheless, the Walgreen theists' view is distinct from some contemporary postliberal theories in its emphasis on the constitutionally limited role of the state in regard to the spiritual and support for representative institutions of deliberation, as traditionally conceived in the United States.[16]

Efforts to reclaim these premises and reorient the institutions and norms of constitutional democracy in light of them saw some formal success in the sphere of Catholic theology and political theory, most obviously in the output of the Second Vatican Council and the rise of the Christian Democrats in Western Europe; the influence of Maritain's work and of his contemporary John Courtney Murray can be seen in these developments.[17] We can also note traces of these ideas in Pope John Paul II's writings and encyclicals, as well as Pope Benedict XVI's *Values in a Time of Upheaval*.[18] Neoconservative Catholic thinkers such as Richard John Neuhaus, George Weigel, and Robert George have put related ideas to use opposing totalitarianism in general, communism in particular, and liberation theology, as well as the marginalization of religion and theological reasoning in public discourse.[19]

This article focuses on Maritain, Simon, and Hallowell. Hallowell has received comparatively limited attention, with the notable exception of works by John G. Gunnell and an edited volume by Francis Canavan.[20] Russell Kirk cites Hallowell in *The Roots of American Order* to close his explication of the stamp of Christian influence on the American political tradition.[21] Hallowell, who became an Episcopalian after attending lectures by Niebuhr, was the focus of Wormuth's attack on "Walgreen political science," which also includes mention of Voegelin and Strauss. Wormuth claims that Voegelin, Strauss, and Hallowell all have a "common source" that forms "the basis of Walgreen political science": "the politics of St. Thomas Aquinas."[22] While these thinkers did not necessarily plan their works or seek to constitute a school of thought, several of them ran in similar circles and had extensive contact with one another.[23] Simon and Maritain carried on an extensive correspondence and maintained an intellectual friendship.[24]

The Theory of "Authentic Democracy"[25]

Wormuth's claim that Aquinas's politics forms the basis of Walgreen science may not work for Strauss, but it is reasonably accurate for Maritain, Simon, and Hallowell.[26] The Walgreen theists, along with their critics, worked from the premise that systems of government necessarily correspond to an underlying philosophy of human life, however implicit. Democracy rests on metaphysical principles and a philosophical anthropology found in Christian teaching, best articulated by Aquinas. In the foreword to Simon's *The Philosophy of Democratic Government*, Kerwin explains the goal of the Walgreen Lectures:

> The need for a philosophy that shows democracy to be grounded firmly on rational principles—this need is apparent. These considerations have prompted the Walgreen Foundation to issue a series of volumes setting forth the basic principles on which democracy rests. These books, it is hoped, will help people everywhere to understand the foundations of democracy and to realize that this system stands on those principles that are necessary to maintain human dignity.[27]

Note the careful wording. Kerwin does not claim democracy is the best regime as such, nor does he say it is the only regime "grounded firmly on rational principles." Democracy is a regime that "stands on those principles that are necessary to maintain human dignity." Democracy's true foundations are found in classical realism, particularly its Christian form. Christianity does not require democracy, but democracy depends on Christianity.

The core claim of the Walgreen theists is not that democracy is the only legitimate regime or necessarily the best regime, as with the targets of Kraynak's argument who identify democracy as the necessary corollary of the gospel.[28] Rather, it is that democracy is a legitimate regime, and a proper conception of democracy rests on a true conception of human nature grounded in the principles of classical realism as explicated by Thomas Aquinas. Democracy is

not exempt from certain foundational principles and the constraints of moral law.

Kelsen agreed that political systems correspond to philosophical systems but claimed that democracy—which he describes as "political relativism"—corresponds to "philosophical relativism." Autocracy, or "political absolutism," corresponds to "philosophical absolutism."[29] Does not a regime based on the idea that the right to rule should constantly rotate, including a high degree of toleration for competing viewpoints, entail a degree of relativism? On the contrary, the Walgreen theists present a sustained argument that democracy, properly conceived, does not rest on a relativistic philosophical foundation but on principles derived from "classical realism."[30] These principles include, crucially, the core tenet of classical natural law that a true understanding of human nature yields a true conception of the moral order to which man is subject, and thus of rationally deduced, normative principles of action.[31]

Elements of biblical and Christian teaching can and have provided support for a variety of political structures, including theocracy and monarchy. As Kelsen points out, Maritain acknowledges that Jesus's teaching, the Bible, and church tradition do not necessarily favor one political regime over another.[32] If anything, the Christian tradition has tended to support monarchy over democracy; Aquinas clearly stated that monarchy is superior to democracy.[33] That is not to say biblical and Christian teaching can provide support for any political structure—they clearly rule out atheistic totalitarianism, for example. Each type of regime, to be a just and legitimate regime, is subject to the requirements of justice, rooted in the divinely ordained purpose of government and politics: to secure conditions in which human persons can pursue their true end of life eternal with God. The divinely ordained purpose of temporal politics and government also applies to this form of government, though it might not seem so because it is oriented toward self-government, liberty, and institutions that incorporate and channel partisan competition. Democracy—more specifically, constitutional democracy with a heavy dose of liberalism—is the political structure and tradition citizens of the United States have

inherited. It is a legitimate form of government, worthy object of aspiration and effort to more fully realize.

Constitutional Democracy as Aristotelian Polity

Crucial to the qualified defense of democracy the Walgreen theists present is a particular definition of the term. In this view, democracy primarily connotes self-government.[34] Since democracy is a government based on the consent of the governed, it involves deliberative institutions designed to allow opportunities for the broad mass of people, irrespective of birth or station, to have input about the policies the government adopts.[35] The Walgreen theorists reject a procedural definition of democracy as a government that converts the choice of the majority into policy to the greatest degree possible, along with a conception of democracy as fundamentally oriented toward generating compromise between competing interests.[36] Rather, democracy is oriented toward rational deliberation about policies that will promote the common good.[37] Democracy is not merely procedural, but it does suggest a slew of commitments and institutions beyond simple majority rule, including civil liberties, political parties and the idea of the loyal opposition, and courts. It is constitutional democracy the Walgreen theists defend.[38]

The Walgreen case for democracy thus defined rests on several underlying assumptions about reality, epistemology, and human nature.[39] There exists an objective reality and an objective, universal human nature. Human beings are in essence rational and free.[40] They are capable of deliberation and government by discussion and persuasion, or at least recognizing those who are capable of such deliberation.[41] The equal moral worth of human beings, all of whom are in some fashion to be included or represented in the deliberative process, is another axiom.[42] There is, however, also a recognition of the need for law and government as a consequence of the sinful, fallen nature of human beings.[43] Finally, this notion of democracy includes the assumption that an objective common good exists and is the proper object of deliberation and public policy.[44]

The Walgreen theists support institutions designed to register and channel the opinion of those governed to those who govern and to make the decisions of those who govern reflect that opinion. They emphasize the importance of deliberation based on common values and appeals to conscience as central to the functioning of democratic government. As aforementioned, since there are different visions of how to achieve the common good, political parties are allowed to compete for office, presenting alternative visions and programs for governance. Respect for "loyal opposition" is essential, and party adversaries are not to be treated as enemies.[45] Finally, the Walgreen theists emphasize the principle of subsidiarity and the structural arrangements associated with federalism to avoid excessive concentrations of power.[46]

Some departures in this account from other accounts of democracy are noteworthy. While government in democracy rests on consent of the governed, the ultimate source of government legitimacy, or authority, is not popular consent or will.[47] The Walgreen theists adhere to the classical and Thomistic view that government is a necessary institution, grounded in the social and political nature of human beings.[48] The state is a necessary instrument that helps human communities be as fully human as possible, to order their affairs in accord with the natural law. Against political philosophers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, however, they accept the principle of representative government. They conceive the function of the representative not as channeling parochial interests but as deliberating in the interest of the whole. The task of the representative is the task of the legislator, conceived in Edmund Burke's terms as oriented toward serving the common good and not only the particular interests of constituents.[49]

More fundamentally, these theorists trace the roots of democracy—the belief in human equality and dignity, the conception of man as a spiritual being possessing reason and will, and the recognition of sin—to theological foundations in the Christian view of man as created in the divine image.[50] Democracy is a form of government in which consent is required, through the electoral process, with regard to the selection of people who will fill offices and will exercise preexistent political authority. Further,

democratic rule requires persuasion and deliberation to the greatest degree possible, as opposed to rule through brute force—though force is still a necessary component of governance.[51]

Another important departure from other accounts of democracy is the emphasis on the objective common good as the standard of government policy. Discerning the common good is the goal of deliberation, and indeed doing so constrains deliberation. In a passage Hallowell quotes, Simon describes the process of democratic deliberation, in what he calls "fully normal circumstances," as oriented toward discerning the proper means for achieving agreed-upon ends, not toward determining the ends themselves, which relate to fundamental, unchallenged principles of social life.[52] These are predetermined by the common good. Finally, while the Walgreen theists defend democracy, they also recognize that it tends toward anarchy.[53] They thus promote institutional arrangements that tend to filter public opinion and buffer the implementation of majority preferences, support political parties, and express skepticism about proportional representation.[54]

Walgreen political science does not necessarily treat democracy, as conceptualized in the foregoing, as the only legitimate form of government, but it does view democracy as a legitimate form of government that accords with and is grounded on natural law, the principles of classical realism, and Christian teaching. The Walgreen theists, especially Hallowell, emphasize that democracy, like any form of government, is subject to objective moral criteria derived from human nature as it really is. The purpose of all politics and government is to secure conditions in which human beings can become more truly human, more fully embracing the divinely ordained form of life appropriate to their nature, which is distinguished from that of other animals by virtue of a unique capacity for reason and will. Defensible democracy rests on the recognition of the objective moral law and is oriented toward the common good of human persons in community. Democracy further rests on and especially recognizes the equal spiritual worth and dignity of each human person, based on the teaching of the *imago dei*. It is an ideal worthy of support and effort to more fully realize, and it is capable of providing a standard of evaluation.

Equality, Liberty, and Liberalism

Walgreen political science incorporates a defense of civil liberties that include religious liberty and freedom of speech, party competition, and other hallmarks of what has come to be described as liberal democracy, but Hallowell and others were critical of the philosophy of liberalism.[55] Their critiques prefigure contemporary postliberal charges against liberalism, particularly its focus on the individual self and its desires, and the attendant atomistic consequences. The person possesses reason and will, but the freedom of the human person is designed to enable him to pursue his true purpose, responding to God's creative and redemptive action in history. As opposed to social contract theories characteristic of prominent strands of liberalism, government does not derive its authority from the consent of the governed; authority is essential to human society, according to the moral law and the need for ordering human affairs toward the common good. Rather than making procedural arguments rooted in contractarian logic, Walgreen theists make substantive arguments rooted in human dignity or the likelihood of constitutional arrangements to promote the common good for institutions associated with liberal constitutionalism.

While critiquing contemporary liberalism, Hallowell notes that a revivified political theory should also preserve the goods classical liberalism promoted, many of them with a premodern pedigree.[56] Political and civil liberty are indeed goods, part of the common good of a society of human persons with reason and will, naturally inclined toward the pursuit of truth and union with God. The proper basis of both democracy and liberalism "integrally conceived" rests on theological foundations, on the spiritual nature of human beings.[57]

The Primacy of the Spiritual

We come now to a crucial, distinctive element of the Thomistic account of democracy: the primacy of the spiritual.[58] Democracy is aimed at securing liberty and self-government.[59] It thus rests on a spiritual conception of the human person as a unique being endowed with reason, the capacity for self-government, and a "supratemporal destiny."[60] Human equality, equality of moral

worth and not empirical similarity, is based on a teaching about the spiritual essence of the human person. For the Walgreen theists, there is an important distinction between the spiritual or eternal and the temporal common good, and the spiritual is superior to the temporal.[61] The state is the institution tasked with care for the temporal common good, which is primarily concerned with justice. The state's role with regard to the spiritual common good is limited.

Connected to the primacy of the spiritual is the important place of the church as an authoritative institution. It is an authoritative institution and a society in its own right that limits the authority of the state, declaring the reality and primacy of the spiritual.[62] Maritain in particular, in a chapter on "Church and State," aims to chart a middle course between French-style *laïcité* and the integralist arrangements of the Middle Ages. Maritain identifies three general principles that describe the proper relationship between church and state that must be applied in some fashion but that can vary according to historical circumstances: (1) The "*freedom of the Church to teach and preach and worship, the freedom of the Gospel, the freedom of the word of God*"; (2) "*the superiority of the Church—that is, of the spiritual—over the body politic or the State*"; and (3) "*the necessary cooperation between the Church and the body politic or the State*."[63] The church, or the Kingdom of God, is a "supra-political" society that transcends the body politic and is superior to it.[64] Its members are under the concurrent jurisdiction of the church, concerned with their supernatural and eternal good, and the state, concerned with the temporal common good.

While in the era of modern democracy the church does not receive the traditional support of state establishment, it retains its moral and spiritual authority, exercising authority more fully than when it enjoys state support, since the church relies on voluntary participation.[65] Still, the state and the church should cooperate, both because the state is tasked with providing conditions in which the persons that make up the body politic can pursue their ultimate end, and since the very foundations of democracy and the common good rest on the teachings of the church. For example,

state-supported public schools should explicate the religious roots of democratic principles, the state should publicly recognize the existence of God in a manner appropriate to its history and traditions, and the state should invite the church to participate in educative functions and other acts of service for the body politic.[66] The state is not the secular arm of the church, but it is bound to recognize the church's superiority, its transcendent purpose.

The relationship between the church's spiritual and moral authority and democratic self-government is a perplexing and delicate one. If all people are deemed equally rational and worthy of respect, then how can the church command a special level of authority? How can this supra-political authority respect personal liberty? There are two answers. One is that since the very foundations of spiritual equality and of the respect for each person as a rational being possessed of a will are grounded in theological conviction, the institution whose primary task is to proclaim the theological truths that ground these foundations can properly command respect and deference. Second, the manner in which the authority of the church is to be exercised is through voluntary participation. Maritain argues that an established church is not necessary to protect the freedom of the church, which a just political order—an order properly respecting the transcendent destiny of the person—must protect. Maritain also developed an argument for religious liberty that would later find expression in *Dignitatis Humanae* (1965) that the personal response to God is properly free and uncoerced, an argument that fits well with the anthropological argument for democracy the Walgreen theists advance.

Maritain also has in mind a version of an overlapping consensus in which people of faiths besides Christianity or no faith will agree on political principles constituting a "secular faith," even as they may disagree on their underlying justifications.[67] He characterizes this situation as a "democratic charter," resting on a common democratic "creed" that, while justifiable from a variety of perspectives, is best justified by Christian anthropological premises.[68] That, along with the notion that the church retains a spiritualized

superiority above the temporal power, is the basis for describing the arrangement as a new form of Christendom, a "Christianly inspired civilization" in which the church enjoys freedom and exercises its superiority through moral example and witness, not through direct influence on temporal authority.[69]

These are the fundamentals of Walgreen political science and its conception of authentic democracy. Democracy as a form of government is not merely a procedural device to translate the majority preference into policy; it is a complex of institutions whose animating principles rest on fundamental premises about human nature grounded in reason and revelation. Reviving democracy depends on widespread recognition of these principles, chief among them the primacy of the spiritual and the recognition of the objective common good as a goal of public deliberation in the context of shared moral values. We turn now to criticisms of Walgreen political science and its view of democracy from both relativist and religious viewpoints.

Responding to Relativist Counterpoints

The relativist and the religious critiques of Walgreen political science both relate to the question of how democratic self-government and the respect for truth, including core truths supposed to most firmly ground democracy, can be reconciled. How can a system dedicated to self-government, requiring to as high a degree as possible the consent of the governed and the preservation of conscience, along with tolerance for alternative opinions, also preserve and vivify core truths on which it is based? Is Simon's suggestion that deliberation, at least ideally, ought to be limited to means, and not ends that must remain fixed, contradictory to the preservation of the freedoms of speech and religion?

Wormuth and Kelsen lodge a serious charge against the Walgreen theists and other Christian thinkers in their orbit, comparing their claim to possess certain core truths with the claim of the Soviet Union's rulers and Adolf Hitler's regime.[70] Challenging Hallowell's attribution of totalitarian dictatorship's rise to legal positivism and philosophical relativism, they counter that the

opposite is the case: the rise of totalitarian dictatorship is the result of absolutism, of the claim of some to know the objective common good. Kelsen attacks the substitution of substantive definitions of democracy for a procedural definition, describing such an approach as a "perversion of democracy" that characterizes the "political doctrine" of the Soviet Union and the National Socialist Party in Germany, but also of Voegelin's "new science of politics."[71] Kelsen agrees that the metaphysical systems correspond to political systems, but he argues that an absolutistic metaphysical system—a system in which absolute truths such as justice can be known—correspond to absolutistic political systems. A belief in the possibility of certain knowledge about moral and political truths suggests an attendant political absolutism, with the knower, the possessor of that knowledge, in charge. In contrast, a belief in only relative moral values—and Kelsen is at pains to emphasize that such values can still be valid or important enough to motivate political action—suggests openness to opposing views and a commitment to democratic discussion and majority rule.[72]

Kelsen's definition of democracy is procedural, connoting the translation of majority opinion, which may change, into public policy.[73] He draws a stark distinction between two parts of Abraham Lincoln's description of democracy as government "of the people, by the people, for the people." Democracy, Kelsen argues, is government of and by the people, but not for the people. Government for the people does not require mass participation, but it could just as well be government of and by one group, perhaps even a minority group, to impose its own notion of the common good on the multitude—indeed, he claims this is the mode of governance in totalitarian regimes like the Soviet Union. Democracy is about government by the people, and it is based on the notion that no particular person or group can claim to know with certainty what governance for the people would look like. There is no objective, discernible common good.[74]

Kelsen argues that Hallowell misconstrues relativism and legal positivism, claiming that relative values can still be embraced as meaningful by those who hold the value, provided they recognize

others might hold different values just as meaningful to them.[75] What relativism requires is the acceptance of other values as also meaningful to those who hold them. That may be the case, but it does not address Hallowell's argument. Indeed, if values are meaningful and binding because they are embraced by those who hold them as meaningful and binding, Hallowell is correct that there is no ultimate standard by which to evaluate the selection of one value over a competing value. Some value racial purity; others value equal human dignity regardless of race. Values are meaningful because they are embraced, and not embraced because they are intrinsically meaningful. Without an objective standard of value, we could not determine which value to embrace. Kelsen concedes that "the judgment that democracy is a good or the best form of government, cannot be proved by means of rational, scientific cognition to be absolute, that is to say, excluding the possibility of a contrary value judgment."[76]

Kelsen is also mistaken to suggest that the level of absoluteness with which one holds a moral or political belief determines the proper form of the political regime or the political behavior that ought to follow from the belief. The idea that the good must be imposed through the agency of the state does not necessarily follow from supposed knowledge of the good, however certain.[77] Consider the case of a strict pacifist, entirely sure of an expansive pacifism countenancing no actions of violence. For this pacifist, all other beliefs about whether the use of force is justified are false. This belief, however absolutely held, does not at all favor an autocratic political system. It may favor anarchy, but not an absolutist political system. We could imagine other beliefs grounded in supposed certainty of a more nuanced form, based in perceived knowledge of absolute moral truth, that do not require an autocratic system. Kelsen himself acknowledges that Aquinas argued for a degree of tolerance, a limited degree to be sure, for non-Christian religious practices in some cases.[78] The content of the belief about objective justice or morality is what matters when it comes to determining the form of political institutions or political behavior, not the degree of certainty or absoluteness with which the belief is held.

Might not a defense of democracy itself, relative to other alternatives, require beliefs held to be certain, sacred, or absolute? Critics of certainty about enduring moral truths implicitly accept a moral preference for democracy and government by persuasion and discussion. Much of Morson and Schapiro's argument against fundamentalism, for example, assumes the imperative of preserving democracy.[79] Why should this commitment take precedence if it is not objectively valuable and worth preserving? In Kelsen's view, the answer is simply because it is a value we have embraced; there is no rational reason for doing so.[80] But what if some citizens could hold other values, perhaps values based on what Morson and Schapiro describe as fundamentalism? In that case, the defender of democracy would be obliged to give reasons to preserve democracy instead of those values. The case for democratic competition as opposed to a one-party state, for allowing institutions designed to foster civil debate and disagreement, rests on an underlying premise about respect for dissenting views and the people who hold them, based on the worth of each person or some other reason. If the goal of preserving deliberation and debate is to preserve democracy, democracy must be held sacred or as rationally preferred to alternatives. Democracy needs its fundamentalist defenders. The Walgreen theists can provide reasons grounded in reason and revelation to hold to these beliefs, reasons taken to be based in a high degree of certainty.[81]

Still, a question remains: How to reconcile the preservation of core truths that provide the firmest foundations for democratic governance, including truths of revelation that Christians and the church proclaim, with democratic self-government and civil liberties? The question of how the substantive, objective common good can be identified and preserved in such a regime and in conditions of pluralism regarding ultimate human ends also presents itself. The basic answer these theorists give to the question of how to reconcile democratic freedom and truth, or freedom and authority, is that freedom must be used well. Authoritative institutions, most notably the church, must articulate core truths clearly and in a

compelling way, participating in the processes for deliberation democratic freedom affords.

Wormuth raises this issue in his review of Hallowell's book, charging Hallowell and Simon with abandoning religious liberty and essentially advocating a return to such suppressive measures as heresy trials. Their treatment of a substantive notion of the common good as the basis of government and aim of public policy, he argues, necessitates such an approach.[82] Hallowell himself, when asked how he would respond to a Muslim opponent in dialogue, replied, "Convert him."[83] However, he also made the point, counter to Wormuth's claim, that a person's belief that he has some knowledge of truth does not necessarily lead to the use of coercion to convince others.[84] From the context, it is clear that his statement about conversion does not refer to the implementation of a state-enforced religion.

Wormuth's claim that "religious liberty is nowhere included as one of the democratic values" for Simon and Hallowell and that they do not support a high degree of freedom and of the press is mistaken.[85] Simon clearly states that while in what he describes as "fully normal" circumstances the ends of political life are not subject to debate, a very high degree of tolerance for dissent and debate on the ends must be practiced for a variety of reasons.[86] Hallowell also describes the preservation of "the whole range of civil liberties," including freedom of speech, the press, and assembly, as an essential prerequisite for securing government by consent.[87] While he does not explicitly mention freedom of religion, there is little reason to doubt he would include it within the whole range, as he seems to be referring to the First Amendment of the US Constitution. In his argument for the primacy of the spiritual, he also explicitly mentions "the existence of a sphere of human life over which no political control may legitimately be exercised."[88] Although they argue for the political community's greater recognition of the primacy of the spiritual, chiefly consisting in preserving the freedom of the church, public recognition of God, and cooperation with the church, the primary thrust of their view treats conscience—shared recognition of objective truth—as the

mediator between truth and freedom.[89] Indeed, this reliance on conscience is the source of the religious critique discussed next. If Kelsen and Wormuth charged the Walgreen theists with imposing an unquestionable orthodoxy on the political community, others accused them of failing to do so.

Responding to Religious Counterpoints

Maritain's account of the democratic charter, the common good, and his proposal for a Christianly inspired society that would respect the superiority of the church without an establishment has been the subject of much controversy and criticism.[90] Discussion of his work has recently spilled into public commentary amid debates on Catholic integralism and postliberalism.[91] For Christians, this debate is of greater moment than that with the positivists and relativists, relating to fundamental questions about the proper relation between the church and the civic authority, and the proper orientation of the Christian toward temporal politics.

A major argument against Maritain is that while couched in terms of the primacy of the spiritual, his Thomistic case for democracy relegates the church to a limited role, accepting a de facto status as one of many voluntary associations or nonprofit organizations in the polity. Since the church does not retain actual political or juridical authority, but only a generalized and vague spiritual authority, the primacy of the spiritual is an empty doctrine. Kolnai's critique of Maritain's *Man and the State* takes issue with Maritain's description of the growth of liberal democracy as evidence of increasing gospel inspiration and of consciences increasingly formed by Christianity—a sort of secularized instantiation of Christian morality.[92] While Maritain claims to preserve the primacy of the spiritual, he in fact relegates the church to a secondary status, without any real authority.[93] Maritain inadvertently promotes a religion of humanity, a secularized, watered-down version of Christianity.

A second, related critique pertains to Maritain's conception of a gospel-inspired democratic charter, simultaneously reliant on

Christian philosophy as its truest foundation but justified by differing philosophical frameworks. One might object to the idea that a consensus on political goods can be maintained even as the philosophical and theological foundations differ.[94] Kozinski argues that while Maritain acknowledges the need for a true comprehensive doctrine as the basis for the regime, his pluralist conception of democracy is as incoherent as Rawlsian public reason because he claims that agreement on the comprehensive doctrine is unnecessary for the functioning of the regime.[95] If there is need for consensus about the purpose of politics, the nature of the common good, and the human person, which the Walgreen theists affirm, why should that consensus not include full recognition of the truth as revealed in revelation, reason, and tradition?

Third, some contemporary Catholic thinkers object to Maritain's characterization of the common good and the relation between the person and the community.[96] The philosophical debate is highly technical and beyond the scope of this article, but the upshot of the critique is that a political community refusing to publicly acknowledge God and promote the true faith cannot truly be oriented to the common good of all its members. Maritain's "gentler Christendom" is not robust enough to serve the common good, properly understood. Freedom of conscience does not guarantee the achievement of the common good.[97]

The relativist and religious critiques dovetail. If the spiritual is primary and the theological foundations of democratic society are so important, the state should promote the spiritual in addition to the temporal common good. A Walgreen political science answer to both the relativist and the religious opponents of the connection between freedom and truth resists use of state power to coerce or induce Christian belief or practice, while recognizing the need for robust presentations of foundational, true beliefs. The Walgreen political scientist appeals to elements of Thomistic anthropology and his idea of natural law, if not Thomas's particular judgment regarding the use of state power to suppress heresy. Human beings, as created in the divine image, naturally incline toward the good, toward the common good. They naturally incline, ultimately,

toward God. They possess, or rather participate in, reason.[98] We might infer from this that free choice is the mode in which human beings most properly pursue God, and respect for their capacity to deliberate about the common good is in order. As John Paul II argues, the church's evangelistic mission, based on the example of Christ, includes "a deep esteem for man, for his intellect, his will, his conscience and his freedom."[99] Indeed, this respect for human dignity and conscience also represents a faith in the actual primacy of the spiritual, the working of the Holy Spirit in human society, in a manner that is more powerful than material inducement or coercive measures.

Catholicism, Natural Law, and the American Constitutional Order

Can Walgreen political science really reconcile Christian political thought with the American regime? Or is it too heavily Catholic and too focused on natural law? No doubt, the founding and early history of the American republic was much more influenced by the Puritan and Protestant heritage than Catholicism, Maryland and some notable Catholics notwithstanding. Nevertheless, Maritain and Simon's Catholicism and Hallowell's classical realism do not obstruct the resonance of their thought with the American political tradition. Indeed, they recover and amplify certain elements of that tradition.

We should first of all note that while Kerwin and several contributors to the lecture series were Catholic, Hallowell was a Protestant. As noted, he also drew on a prominent Protestant thinker, Reinhold Niebuhr, especially channeling his argument for reclaiming a sense of human fallenness and original sin.[100] Second, though, there are several important contributors to and interpreters of the American political tradition who were Catholic: Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Orestes Brownson, for example.[101] Many of these thinkers emphasize the connection between liberty and religion, specifically the Christian religion, in the American tradition. A number of scholars and writers have also argued that many of the beliefs and traditions that are part and parcel of the American political

inheritance from Great Britain are deeply indebted to the medieval experience and tradition of political thought.[102] Further, the vision of state promotion of and cooperation with religious institutions, combined with robust liberty of conscience and freedom of public worship associated with magisterial Protestantism, pairs reasonably well with Maritain's proposals and the Walgreen view articulated here.[103]

The relevance of natural law in the context of the "natural rights Republic" and American democracy is much clearer cut.[104] Contrary to C. Bradley Thompson's claim that the American founders, "rejected the Aristotelian-Christian view that saw nature *teleologically*—that is, as guided by a divine purpose and naturally striving to achieve a hierarchy of preordained ends," some important founders incorporated notions of virtue and natural law into their political thought.[105] This is clearly the case for John Adams and for James Wilson, two major contributors to the founding.[106] A number of scholars argue that the American founders understood natural rights to flow from and be couched within the context of natural law, though there are important debates about the practical implication of that context and the specific strain of natural law theory that influenced the founding.[107] Suffice it to say that the concept of natural law is far from foreign to the American political and constitutional tradition.

Truth, Freedom, and the Church

The historical and conceptual relevance of natural law and other medieval, Catholic inheritances to the American political tradition notwithstanding, Maritain's proposal for a Christianly inspired society seems to have failed in the United States and Europe. The consensus with regard to the ends of government and human life that Maritain, Simon, and Hallowell describe as normal for a functioning, authentic democracy does not describe contemporary reality in the West. As Maritain predicted, competing accounts of the human person and the philosophy underlying democracy give rise to competing and contradictory accounts of the extent of various rights.[108] Lewis raises an important question for Maritain and

Walgreen political science in the context of pluralism and rejection of not only Christianity but also classical natural law:

> What would Maritain have said about controversies involving late-term abortion, assisted suicide, or same-sex marriage? In such circumstances, it would seem that the very nature of Maritain's personalism may be, at least to some degree, at odds with this irenic political aim, a possibility that is perhaps more visible to us nearly half a century after Maritain's death. No further development of Christian personalism as a political theory can avoid this problem.[109]

One part of a response is to observe that contemporary trends or prospects for authentic democracy do not by themselves invalidate the argument for it. Rather, the theory can serve as a framework from which to critique present trends. Another part of the answer would emphasize and develop the elements of Walgreen political science treating the Christian church as a distinctive, authoritative institution. A more complete attempt to do so must be left for future research, but we may conclude with a few thoughts toward this end.

No less than Catholic integralism, the authentic democracy of the Walgreen theists is a "*two-polity* political theory."[110] The church is the primary point of reference in terms of loyalty and authority for the Christian, retaining a high degree of jurisdiction over its members, though not the jurisdiction to call the state to suppress heresy through coercion. If natural law theory cannot be expected to convince advocates of abandonment of traditional moral norms, by studying it, members of the church may use it to renew their own imaginations and sense of the richness of the view that human beings are created for the purpose of union with God. Even amid the church's current state of disunion—despite the widely shared belief in the "one, holy, catholic and apostolic church" of the Nicene Creed—Christians may cultivate a sense of ecumenical cooperation as an alternative to the secularizing imagination and social order. Cross-denominational study of Aquinas and of the

Walgreen theists who retained the theological and philosophical grounding for natural law while others jettisoned it may be a part of this effort.[111]

Even in the midst of persecution or opposition, as in the pre-Constantinian period in the Roman Empire or the days of the Nazi regime in Germany, the church stands as a witness to the truth about human persons and human destiny, adopting a "prophetic stance."[112] The church's mission and witness is not diminished if the democratic regime fails to achieve unity and stability, though the success of the polity can aid the work of the church. Members of the church act lovingly toward fellow citizens, abjuring the use of the coercive power to the extent consistent with the temporal common good. That includes the respect for religious liberty and conscience outlined in *Dignitatis Humanae*.

One of the main implications of a revived Walgreen political science would be a focus on reviving and deepening the deliberative aspect of democratic institutions and public life. Government by deliberation and persuasion remains a worthy ideal to pursue because it promotes a profound respect for the equal dignity and worth of each human person, a unique type of being possessing a will and participating in reason oriented toward truth. Paradoxically, the church can best contribute to the effort to revive deliberative institutions through its witness to the moral and spiritual truths it proclaims, through vigorous pursuit of the church's ultimate aim, which transcends the temporal political community.

Notes

1. John G. Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Russell Hittinger, "Introduction," in Heinrich A. Rommen, *The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998), xi–xxxii.
2. Francis D. Wormuth, "*The Moral Foundation of Democracy*, by John Hallowell," *Indiana Law Journal* 30, no. 3 (Spring 1955): 375.
3. John H. Hallowell, *The Moral Foundation of Democracy* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007 [1954]), 102, 107.
4. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 99.

5. Robert P. George, "Law and Moral Purpose," *First Things*, January 2008, Accessed August 15, 2023, https://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/01/law-and-moral-purpose.
6. David Austin Walsh, "Conservative Philanthropy in Higher Education," Urban Institute, June 2019, accessed August 15, 2023, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2019/06/27/conservative_philanthropy_in_higher_education.pdf; John W. Boyer, *Academic Freedom and the Modern University: The Experience of the University of Chicago*, Occasional Papers on Higher Education, vol. 10 (Chicago: College of the University of Chicago, 2002); Edward Nik-Khah, "George Stigler, The Graduate School of Business, and the Pillars of the Chicago School," in *Building Chicago Economics: New Perspectives on the History of America's Most Powerful Economics Program*, ed. Robert van Horn, Philip Mirowski, and Thomas A. Stapleford (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 116–51.
7. A biographical note about Charles Walgreen Sr. that Charles R. Walgreen Jr. sent to Kerwin on June 11, 1956, mentions that Walgreen Sr. "was a quiet, modest man with a deep and abiding faith in the principles of democracy" and that he contributed $550,000 to the University of Chicago to establish the foundation in order to "help spread a deeper understanding of the American way of life" (Charles R. Walgreen Foundation. Records, Box III, Folder 12, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library). A January 11, 1944, letter from the first executive secretary, William T. Hutchinson, to Margaret Cressaty indicates that the executive secretary selected lecture topics and speakers. A March 31, 1943, letter from Hutchinson to Walgreen Jr. and some other relevant correspondence note that the remit of the foundation and the definition of institutions are intentionally defined and treated broadly (Charles R. Walgreen Foundation. Records, Box III, Folder 11, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
8. Forewords to collections of lectures for two different years in the 1940s included the following statement: "Lectures given at the University of Chicago under the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the study of American Institutions are designed to assist students toward an understanding of contemporary life in the United States, its background in history, its ideals, values, and institutions, its present needs and possible future. To foster an intelligent citizenship and patriotism, not narrowly nationalistic in their expression, and with thought and

knowledge much more than emotion as their foundation, is a principal purpose of this Foundation" ("Foreword" for each of the Walgreen volumes, 1941–1942, Charles R. Walgreen Foundation. Records, Box III, Folder 9, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).

9. On Voegelin's complicated views with regard to Christianity and its influence in Western civilization, see Jeffrey C. Herndon, *Eric Voegelin and the Problem of Christian Political Order*, Eric Voegelin Institute Series in Political Philosophy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007). For a discussion of Voegelin's personal beliefs and Christianity, see Ellis Sandoz, "Voegelin's Relationship to Christianity," *VoegelinView*, November 5, 2012, accessed August 15, 2023, https://voegelinview.com/carrying-coals-to-newcastle.
10. Jerome G. Kerwin, "Foreword," in Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*. See also Gunnell, *Descent of Political Theory*, 240.
11. See Cary J. Nederman, "Introduction to the Transaction Edition," in Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves, *Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996 [1951]), vii–xxvi for a discussion of legal positivism, its dominance in legal philosophy in the mid-twentieth century, and the challenge to its dominance from neo-Thomists including Maritain, Etienne Gilson, and Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves. D'Entrèves gave eight lectures that became *Natural Law* at the University of Chicago in 1948 for the Committee on Social Thought, headed by John U. Nef, and where émigré scholars such as Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, and F. A. Hayek worked. Nederman, "Introduction," x–xi; Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves, *Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1996 [1951]), 11.
12. Kelsen, a leading twentieth-century positivist, connects positivism with philosophical relativism (Hans Kelsen, "Foundations of Democracy," *Ethics* 66, no. 1, pt. 2 [1955]: 17). Quoting a definition from Guido de Ruggiero, Hallowell defines positivism as "a philosophical tendency oriented around natural science and striving for a unified view of the world of phenomena, both physical and human, through the application of methods and the extension of results whereby the natural sciences have attained their unrivaled position in the modern world." He continues, "Truth is described by the positivist simply as that which can be described inductively from the empirical observation of successive events. . . . The positivist tends to regard all value judgments as expressions simply of subjective individual preference" (Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 67–68).

13. Kelsen, "Foundations of Democracy." Kerwin invited Niebuhr to deliver a series of lectures in 1950, but Niebuhr declined (Jerome G. Kerwin to Reverend Reinhold Niebuhr, June 19, 1950, and Reinhold Niebuhr to Jerome Kerwin, July 3, 1950, Charles R. Walgreen Foundation. Records, Box III, Folder 6, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
14. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005 [1993]), xiv.
15. Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1998 [1951]), 76–84, 103–7.
16. See, e.g., Patrick Deneen, *Why Liberalism Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 7–9, 101–3. See also Milbank and Pabst's critique of the liberal view of representation as a "bastardised mixed constitution" (182) and case for a renewed form of mixed government as a solution to an unstable antagonism between liberal representation and pure mass democracy, the oligarchic rule of the few and the intemperate rule of the many (John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, *The Politics of Virtue: Post-liberalism and the Human Future* [London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016], 179–244).
17. Kerwin invited Murray to deliver four lectures as part of a series on church and state, but Murray declined (Jerome G. Kerwin to Rev. John Courtney Murray, SJ, February 4, 1955, and John Courtney Murray to Jerome Kerwin, April 18, 1955, Charles R. Walgreen Foundation. Records, Box III, Folder 6, Hanna Holborn Gray Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library).
18. Edward Barrett, *Persons and Liberal Democracy: The Ethical and Political Thought of Karol Wojtyla / John Paul II* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); Benedict XVI, *Values in a Time of Upheaval*, trans. Brian McNeil (New York: Crossroad, 2006), 63–64. Novak, who cites Maritain, Murray, and Niebuhr, had opportunities to converse with Pope John Paul II (Michael Novak, *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism* [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982]). This is not a direct link, but it could suggest some traces of influence. There are, however, apparent differences between Novak and John Paul II with regard to capitalism (Todd D. Whitmore, "John Paul II, Michael Novak, and the Differences between Them," *Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics* 21 [2001]: 215–32).
19. Richard John Neuhaus, "Christianity and Democracy: The First Political Task of the Church," *First Things*, October 1996, accessed August 15, 2023, https://www.firstthings.com/article/1996/10/christianity-and-democracy; David L. Schindler, *Heart of the World, Center of the*

Church: Communio Ecclesiology, Liberalism, and Liberation (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1996); Richard John Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1984); Robert George, *Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002); Todd Scribner, *A Partisan Church: American Catholicism and the Rise of Neoconservative Catholics* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2015); Thomas J. Bushlack, *Politics for a Pilgrim Church: A Thomistic Theory of Civic Virtue* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman's, 2015).

20. "American Political Science, Liberalism, and the Invention of Political Theory," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 1 (1988): 71–87; Gunnell, *Descent of Political Theory*; and John G. Gunnell, *Imagining the American Polity: Political Science and the Discourse of Democracy* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2004); Francis Canavan, ed., *The Ethical Dimension of Political Life: Essays in Honor of John Hallowell* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1983).
21. Russell Kirk, *The Roots of American Order*, 4th ed. (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2003 [1974]), 174–76.
22. Gunnell, *Descent of Political Theory*, 202; Wormuth, "*The Moral Foundation of Democracy*," 374–75.
23. Kerwin and Simon (along with Murray) were both charter members of the Catholic Commission on Intellectual and Cultural Affairs (CCICA), founded in 1946, and Maritain was also a member (Patrick J. Hayes, *A Catholic Brain Trust: The History of the Catholic Commission on Intellectual and Cultural Affairs, 1945–1965* [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011]). Simon was a colleague of Strauss's at the University of Chicago.
24. Leo R. Ward, "Meeting Jacques Maritain," *Review of Politics* 44, no. 4 (1982): 483–88.
25. John Paul II's invocation of "authentic democracy" in *Centesimus Annus* conveys the picture of democracy in the Walgreen theists' works (John Paul II, *Centesimus Annus*, no. 46, May 1, 1991, accessed August 15, 2023, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html).
26. For explorations of the relationship between Catholic thought and Strauss's ideas, see Geoffrey M. Vaughan, ed., *Leo Strauss and His Catholic Readers* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2018). For further discussion and analysis of both Strauss and Voegelin and their relationship to conservatism and many themes

pertinent to Walgreen political science, see Ted V. McAllister, *Revolt against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and the Search for a Postliberal Order* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995).

27. Jerome G. Kerwin, "Foreword," in Yves Simon, *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2017 [1951]), vii.
28. Robert P. Kraynak, *Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God and Politics in the Fallen World* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2001), 1. Barrett suggests that John Paul II, along with Simon, Maritain, and Rommen, made the case that democracy is "the form of politics most compatible with Christian values" (Barrett, *Persons and Liberal Democracy*, 83n127). This view needs qualification, at least with regard to John Paul II, Maritain, and Rommen. As Barrett notes, John Paul II's support for democracy depends on certain cultural and institutional conditions being met, the conditions of "authentic" democracy (ibid., 64). It is better to say that among the available options in the postwar twentieth century, a properly conceived democracy is, according to these thinkers, most compatible with Christian values. Simon perhaps comes closest to confirming Barrett's claim, though he acknowledges that there may be circumstances in which restricted suffrage or even despotism characterizes the best possible regime. Simon's "transmission theory" (158), which he traces to the works of Aquinas, Thomas Cajetan, and Francisco Suárez, places God-given authority naturally in the whole community but allows the community to designate and transmit authority to a monarch or aristocracy (Yves Simon, *Philosophy of Democratic Government* [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2017 (1951)], 73, 87, 98–99, 158–76). See also Heinrich A. Rommen, *The State in Catholic Thought: A Treatise on Political Philosophy* (Cluny Media, 2016 [1945]), 440.
29. Hans Kelsen, "Foundations of Democracy," 14.
30. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 22.
31. Ibid., 23.
32. Jacques Maritain, *Christianity and Democracy*, in Jacques Maritain, *"Christianity and Democracy" and "The Rights of Man and the Natural Law,"* trans. Dorothy C. Anson (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011 [1943]), 15, 21.
33. Kelsen, "Foundations of Democracy," 37–38; John P. Hittinger, *Liberty, Wisdom, and Grace: Thomism and Democratic Political Theory* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 50. St. Thomas offers several reasons "it is more beneficial for a community of men living together to be ruled by

one than by many," in *De Regimine Principium* I.3 (St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine Principium* in *Aquinas: Political Writings*, ed. R. W. Dyson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 10–11). Even though he concedes in I.4 that tyranny, or the unjust rule of the one, is also the worst form of government, he argues in I.6 that "tyrannical government more often arises from the rule of many than from that of one; and so government by one is better," concluding in I.7 that "the rule of one man is the best simply" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine*, 11–15, 16–21). Still, he also discusses the importance of restricting rulers' power in *De Regimine* I.7 and *Summa Theologiae* IaIIae 105:1 (St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine* 18; St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* IaIIae 105:1: "Concerning the Reason for the Judicial Precepts [of the Old Testament]," in *Aquinas: Political Writings*, ed. R. W. Dyson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 52–56). Here, he agrees with Aristotle that a "polity," a mixed government, is the best—and comes very close to endorsing an elective government that would qualify as a modern democracy: "Hence the best ordering of government in any city or kingdom is achieved when one man is chosen to preside over all according to virtue; and when such government nonetheless belongs to all, both because all are eligible for election to it and because it is elected by all. Such a 'polity' is the best form of government inasmuch as it is a benign mixture of kingship, because there is one man who presides; of aristocracy, because it is the rule of several according to virtue; and of democracy, that is, popular power, because the rulers can be elected from the people and it belongs to the people to elect the rulers" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* IaIIae 105:1, 54).

34. Simon, *Philosophy*, 76; Maritain, *Man and the State*, 101.
35. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 43. See also John Courtney Murray, "The Issue of Church and State at Vatican Council II," *Theological Studies* 27, no. 4 (1966): 602.
36. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 41–42.
37. Ibid., 109.
38. Ibid., 57.
39. Ibid., 21–23.
40. Ibid., 91–92.
41. Simon, *Philosophy*, 22.
42. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 72.
43. Ibid., 113–14. Hallowell cites the two-pronged insight of Niebuhr that "man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary" (Reinhold Niebuhr,

The Children of Light and Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944], xiii).

44. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 24, 51.
45. Ibid., 55.
46. Simon, *Philosophy*, 129–30. Maritain refers to the "pluralist" principle, which is essentially equivalent with subsidiarity (Maritain, *Man and the State*, 21–22).
47. Simon distinguishes what he calls the "coach-driver" theory of democratic authority, in which legislators and governors do not possess any real authority, but only that which is delegated from the people, from the "transmission theory," in which authority to make binding laws rests within the people as a whole but can be transmitted to public officials (Simon, *Philosophy*, 149, 146, 158).
48. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 76, 97; Simon, *Philosophy*, 39. Simon includes a lengthy footnote with a number of relevant quotations expressing this idea to support his claim that authority is an essential element of human society. Milbank and Pabst also present this anthropological claim as a Thomistic alternative to the anthropology of the atomized individual in the social contract tradition (Milbank and Pabst, *Politics of Virtue*, 2–3).
49. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 50–56.
50. Ibid., 90.
51. Ibid., 44; Simon, *Philosophy*, 118–19.
52. Simon, *Philosophy*, 123. See also Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 111.
53. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 43–44; Simon, *Philosophy*, 106.
54. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 51.
55. Hallowell distinguishes between "integrally conceived" or "integral" liberalism propounded in the seventeenth century, which includes the recognition of an objective moral law based on an objective moral order, which the individual acknowledges and voluntarily submits to, and later atomistic variants that abandoned the notion of objective order (John H. Hallowell, "The Decline of Liberalism," *Ethics* 52, no. 3 [1942]: 329; John H. Hallowell, *The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology*, International Library of Sociology [Hoboken, NJ: Routledge, 2013 (1946)], https://search-ebscohost-com.acu.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx; Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 65).
56. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 72. Cf. Deneen, *Why Liberalism Failed*, 19; and Milbank and Pabst, *Politics of Virtue*, 2.
57. Hallowell, *Decline of Liberalism*, 329.

58. Maritain, *Man and the State*, 26. This is a key theme of Maritain's work, prominent in Hallowell's as well. While Voegelin's aim is to sketch, not a theory of democracy, but a philosophy of history and the nature of political representation as a beginning point for recovering classical political science, he treats openness to the transcendent and the soul's encounter with the transcendent as essential for a reality-based polity (Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952]).
59. Maritain, *Man and the State*, 109.
60. Ibid., 26.
61. Ibid., 153. Cf. Aquinas's distinction in *Scripta super libros sententiarum* II, Dist. 44, quaest. 3, between the two realms, with the caveat that he subordinates the secular to the spiritual in more realms than Maritain (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Scripta Super Libros Sententiarum* II, Dist. 44, quaest. 3, in *Aquinas: Political Writings*, ed. R. W. Dyson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 278).
62. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 106; Simon, *Philosophy*, 136–37.
63. Maritain, *Man and the State*, 151–54.
64. Ibid., 175. See also Voegelin, *New Science*, 106.
65. Maritain, *Man and the State*, 163–64. See also Hans Rommen, "Church and State," *Review of Politics* 12, no. 3 (1950): 321–40.
66. Maritain, *Man and the State*, 171–79.
67. Ibid., 110–12.
68. Ibid., 108, 111, 113–14, 125–26.
69. Ibid., 162. See also 150.
70. "Hitler was after all no positivist: on the contrary, he was an absolutist cut from the very piece of cloth our authors peddle" (Wormuth, "*The Moral Foundation of Democracy*," 380). Morson and Schapiro likewise compare the fundamentalist mindset with the Soviet government's monopoly on the truth. Fundamentalists "profess a doctrine that provides complete certainty," embrace the "perspicuity of truth," and "often profess belief in an inerrant text or revelation" (Gary S. Morson and Morton Schapiro, *Minds Wide Shut: How the New Fundamentalisms Divide Us* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021], 22, 29, 47). They write that there are many kinds of fundamentalism; the leadership of the Soviet Union provides a paradigmatic example of political fundamentalism and control of thought.
71. Kelsen, "Foundations of Democracy," 6.
72. Cf. Morson and Schapiro: "In a democracy, politics involves compromise, give-and-take, and seeing the other side's point of view; in a polarized

world, everything becomes a zero-sum game. He who is not with us is against us. . . . Democracy cannot long survive under these conditions. If right is all on one side—if one is absolutely certain that there is nothing to learn from those with whom we disagree—then there is no reason not to have a one-party state" (Morson and Schapiro, *Minds Wide Shut*, xv–xvi).

73. Kelsen, "Foundations of Democracy," 2–3.
74. Ibid., 2.
75. Ibid., 97n70.
76. Ibid.
77. This is a common misconception. Charles Kimball, e.g., argues that the absoluteness of religious truth claims presents a special danger: "In every religion, truth claims constitute the foundation on which the entire structure rests. However, when particular interpretations of these claims become propositions requiring uniform assent and are treated as rigid doctrines, the likelihood of corruption in that tradition rises exponentially. Such tendencies are the first harbingers of the evil that may follow" (Charles Kimball, *When Religion Becomes Evil* [New York: Harper San Francisco, 2002], 41).
78. Kelsen, "Foundations of Democracy," 97n69.
79. See Maritain, *Man and the State*, 110–12.
80. Kelsen, "Foundations of Democracy," 97n70.
81. For an argument that respect for liberty of opinion properly rests on the "postulate of convergence" toward truth based on a belief in the "participation of man in the intelligence of the Creator which underwrites Reason and justifies its use," see Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good*, trans. J. F. Huntington (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1957), 351. See 334–56 for the full discussion.
82. Wormuth, "*The Moral Foundation of Democracy*," 377.
83. Arnold Brecht, "Beyond Relativism in Political Theory," *American Political Science Review* 41, no. 3 (1947): 478.
84. Gunnell's report of this exchange is slightly truncated (Gunnell, *Descent of Political Theory*, 213; Brecht, "Beyond Relativism," 478). Hallowell repeats the point that conviction about truth does not necessarily require coercion: "There is no logical reason to suppose that because an individual believes that certain values transcend personal interests, he also believes that all individuals should be coerced into the acceptance of those values" (Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 38).
85. Wormuth, "*The Moral Foundation of Democracy*," 377.

86. Simon, *Philosophy*, 123. Although Wormuth does not note this, Hallowell proceeds to quote Simon's next point: "In democracy more than any other regime it is a problem to assert principles in such a way as not to jeopardize the free discussion of means, and to insure free discussion of means without jeopardizing the principles without which social life no longer has end or form. The risks proper to democratic practice demand that the assertion of principles be more profound, more vital, and more heartfelt than elsewhere" (Simon, *Philosophy*, 124; Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 111). Expression must be kept as free as possible, since the line between ends and means is unclear and may be debated. Simon advocates for erring on the side of freedom and for citizens themselves and authoritative institutions like the church to take up the task of vigorously expressing core principles.
87. Hallowell, *Moral Foundation*, 44.
88. Ibid., 106.
89. Ibid., 38; Maritain, *Man and the State*, 163–64.
90. Brooke W. Smith, "The Jacques Maritain Controversy," *Thought: Fordham University Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (1975): 381–99; V. Bradley Lewis, "Thomism, Personalism, and Politics: The Case of Jacques Maritain," *Quaestiones Disputatae* 9, no. 2 (2019): 151–73.
91. James Matthew Wilson, "A Defense of Jacques Maritain against His Neo-Integralist Critics," *Church Life Journal*, November 18, 2020, accessed August 15, 2023, https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/in-defense-of-jacques-maritain-against-his-neo-integralist-critics; C. C. Pecknold, "False Notions of the Common Good," *First Things*, April 23, 2020, accessed August 15, 2023. https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2020/04/false-notions-of-the-common-good; Joseph E. Capizzi and V. Bradley Lewis, "Bullish on the Common Good?," *Public Discourse*, May 11, 2020, accessed August 15, 2023, https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2020/05/63220;

    James M. Patterson, "Charles De Koninck vs. Jacques Maritain: Philosophers and Their Choices," *Providence*, December 22, 2021, accessed August 15, 2023, https://providencemag.com/2021/12/charles-de-koninck-vs-jacques-maritain-theologians-choices; Ross Douthat, "A Gentler Christendom," *First Things*, June 2022, accessed August 15, 2022, https://www.firstthings.com/article/2022/06/a-gentler-christendom; Edmund Waldstein "All We Need Is Everything: A Response to Ross Douthat," *First Things*, June 2022, accessed August 15, 2023, https://www.firstthings.com/article/2022/06/all-we-need-is-everything; Daniel Philpott, "Where Have You Gone, Jacques Maritain?," *Public Discourse*,

June 1, 2022, accessed August 16, 2023, https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2022/06/82805; Nathaniel Peters, "Maritain for Our Time," *Public Discourse*, June 23, 2022, accessed August 16, 2023, https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2022/06/82839; Daniel E. Burns, S. F. McGuire, and Justin Hawkins, "Maritain for Our Time: Three Responses to Nathaniel Peters," *Public Discourse*, June 27, 2022, accessed August 16, 2023, https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2022/06/83049.

92. Aurel Kolnai, "Between Christ and the Idols of Modernity: A Review of Jacques Maritain's *Man and the State*," in *Privilege and Liberty and Other Essays in Political Philosophy*, ed. Daniel J. Mahoney (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999 [1951]), 175–82.
93. Kolnai, "Between Christ and the Idols," 176.
94. Peters describes the "the degree to which [the democratic charter] relies on things that come from thematic Christian faith but are not reducible to it" as "the greatest limit of Maritain's political thought" (Peters, "Maritain for Our Time").
95. Thaddeus J. Kozinski, *The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism: And Why Philosophers Can't Solve It* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), xxiii, 81–126.
96. Pecknold, "False Notions"; Waldstein, "All We Need Is Everything."
97. Douthat, "A Gentler Christendom." See also Deneen: "It is not enough to ensure their *freedom* to pursue such goods; rather, it is the duty of the political order to positively guide them, and provide the conditions for the enjoyment of, the goods of human life" (Patrick J. Deneen, "A Good That Is Common," Postliberal Order, November 8, 2021, accessed August 16, 2023, https://postliberalorder.substack.com/p/a-good-that-is-common). Deneen and Ahmari draw on the work of Jean Danielou, SJ, *Prayer as a Political Problem* (1967), to make this argument (Sohrab Ahmari, "Christians Have a Duty to Change Society—Yes, Even at the Level of the State," *Catholic Herald*, July 10, 2020, accessed August 16, 2023, https://catholicherald.co.uk/christians-have-a-duty-to-change-society-yes-even-at-the-level-of-the-state).
98. "Now the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in a more excellent way than any other creature is, inasmuch as it participates in Providence by providing for itself and others. Hence it participates in the eternal reason, by virtue of which it has a natural inclination to the activity and end proper to it; and such participation of the rational creature in the eternal law is called the natural law" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae IaIIae* 91.2, in *Aquinas: Political Writings*, ed. R. W. Dyson [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 86).

99. John Paul II, *Redemptor Hominis*, no. 12, March 4, 1979, accessed August 16, 2023, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_04031979_redemptor-hominis.html. See also Rommen, *State in Catholic Thought*, 44, 447–48; and Cary J. Nederman and Ben Peterson, "Natural Law and Human Rights: Continuities and Discontinuities," in *The Cambridge Handbook of Natural Law and Human Rights*, ed. Tom Angier, Iain T. Benson, and Mark Retter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).
100. Gunnell, *Descent of Political Theory*, 204. In a 1966 interview with *Commonweal*, Niebuhr also expressed belated appreciation for Aristotelian-Thomist natural law, as articulated by contemporary Catholic teachers: "In my anti-Catholic moments, I figured that the natural law tradition was too inflexible, since it is rooted in the metaphysical system of Stoicism or of Aristotelianism. Yet I marvel at the way good Catholic social teachers elaborate what both Aristotle and Thomas believed and how they make pragmatic applications of general principles. I am impressed by the social ethics of modern Catholicism" (Patrick Granfield, "An Interview with Reinhold Niebuhr," *Commonweal*, December 16, 1966, accessed August 16, 2023, https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/interview-reinhold-niebuhr).
101. Peter Augustine Lawler and Richard M. Reinsch II, *A Constitution in Full: Recovering the Unwritten Foundation of American Liberty* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2019).
102. Kirk, *Roots of American Order*; Ellis Sandoz, *A Government of Laws: Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990); Robert Reilly, *America on Trial: Defending the Founding* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2020); Bradley Birzer, "Catholicism and the American Founding," *Catholic World Report*, July 3, 2021, accessed August 30, 2023, https://www.catholicworldreport.com/2023/07/03/catholicism-and-the-american-founding/. .
103. See Joseph Rigney and Glenn A. Moots, "The Myth of 'Liberal, Secular America': A Reply to D. G. Hart," *American Reformer*, July 4, 2023, accessed August 16, 2023, https://americanreformer.org/2023/07/myth-liberal-secular-america.
104. Michael Zuckert, *The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1993).
105. C. Bradley Thompson, *America's Revolutionary Mind: The Moral History of the American Revolution and the Declaration That Defined It* (New York: Encounter Books, 2019), 15.

106. Ben Peterson, "Republican Institutionalism for a 'Government of Laws': The Polybian Political Science of John Adams," *American Political Thought* 8, no. 3 (2019): 323–46, at 338–40; Roberta Bayer, "Natural Law and Democracy: The Philosophy of James Wilson," *Law and Liberty*, November 20, 2018, accessed August 15, 2023, https://lawliberty.org/natural-law-and-democracy-the-philosophy-of-james-wilson.
107. Edward S. Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law," *Harvard Law Review*, 42, no. 2 (1928): 149–85; Philip Hamburger, "Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American Constitutions," *Yale Law Journal* 102 (1993): 907–60; Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, "The Natural Law in the American Tradition," *Fordham Law Review* 79, no. 4 (2010): 1513–28; Thomas G. West, *The Political Theory of the American Founding: Natural Rights, Public Policy, and the Moral Conditions of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 77–94. See also Kerwin himself (Jerome Kerwin, "The Church and the Garrison State," *Review of Politics* 1, no. 2 [1939]: 179–90).
108. Maritain, *Man and the State*, 106.
109. Lewis, "Thomism, Personalism, and Politics," 173.
110. Kevin Vallier, *All the Kingdoms of the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 33; Maritain, *Man and the State*, 151; Jacques Maritain, "The Person and the Common Good," *Review of Politics* 8 (1946): 453. See also Neuhaus, "Christianity and Democracy," on the church and its primary political task: to be the church.
111. Manfred Svensson and David VanDrunen, eds., *Aquinas among the Protestants* (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2017); Brad East, "Theology in Division," *First Things*, April 2023, accessed August 15, 2023, https://www.firstthings.com/article/2023/04/theology-in-division; David VanDrunen, "Why Protestants Have Always Stood on the Shoulders of Thomas Aquinas . . . and Still Do," *Credo*, June 23, 2022, accessed August 15, 2023, https://credomag.com/article/aquinas-among-the-protestants; Russell Hittinger, *The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2003).
112. Glenn Tinder, *The Political Meaning of Christianity: An Interpretation* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 7. Contrast this with what James R. Rogers describes as the free-riding American churches were able to engage in in a culture more obviously influenced—if only superficially—by Christian morality (James R. Rogers, "Good Riddance to Cultural Christianity," *Law and Liberty*, April 19, 2019, accessed August 15, 2022, https://lawliberty.org/good-riddance-cultural-christianity-religious-right).