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AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS

Fighting a Battle on Two Fronts

Wilfred M. McClay
Hillsdale College

Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes
By Steven B. Smith. Yale University Press, 2021. Pp. 256. $28.00

We all have good reason to be grateful for Steven B. Smith's book. It is an earnest and learned effort to make the case that a healthy and balanced expression of patriotism, love of country, is one of the indispensable elements of a successful and well-ordered political life. It cannot have been an easy book to write, because it goes against the grain. Such a position is likely to be almost automatically dismissed in the contemporary academy. It is a book written for academics, and our era's most prominent academics and intellectuals have no use for patriotism. They regard it as a sentiment to be automatically written off as xenophobic, jingoistic, and blind to the needs of the world. A sentimental vestige that makes its home in flyover country and is therefore good for nothing but being flown over.

More's the pity. For there was a time, not so very long ago, when some of the most prominent figures on the left were breaking ranks on the anti-patriotism front. The recent death of sociologist Todd Gitlin, whose 2005 book *The Intellectuals and the Flag* was a signal effort along those lines, is a reminder of that era, which has passed entirely, leaving little trace. Of course, the claims of the nation-state should never be regarded as absolute and all-encompassing. To do so would violate the nature of the American experiment itself, which understands government as accountable to higher imperatives, which we express in various ways: in the language of constitutionalism, of natural rights, of a nation "under

God." The possibility of dissent against the nation for the sake of the nation is built into that formulation. Those who used to say that dissent was a very high form of patriotism were right about that. Such a statement is no less true today, even if the same people are now singing a very different tune.

But by the same token, the claims of critical detachment have their limits, both practically and morally. Loyalty, as Smith makes clear in his first chapter, has its necessary and legitimate claims. It is a sine qua non for political progress, for without some reserves of deep commitment, it will be impossible to call forth the sacrifices needed to advance any difficult cause, foreign or domestic. The habitual resort to the ideal of dissent "against the nation for the nation" can easily become indistinguishable in practice from yet another manifestation of the Great Refusal, in which the second "nation" is a purely imaginary one to be "achieved" (as the late Richard Rorty, perhaps the most prominent of the earlier patriotism-on-the-left faction, liked to put it) and the "troops" one "supports" are entirely distinct from the actual causes for which they are risking their lives, and such "support" shows no respect for the series of conscious choices that made them into "troops" rather than civilians. When we make our commitments to one another entirely contingent and imaginary, or drape them in the diaphanous mantle of "cosmopolitanism," then we have made no commitments at all. There will always be reasons to hold back, always sufficient reasons to say No, if the standard against which one judges the nation is an ahistorical and abstract and imaginary one, and the only consideration in view is the purity of one's own individual position.

As his title implies, Smith is fighting on two fronts. On the Eastern front, he wants to refine and elevate the kind of unreflective patriotism that tends to make its home on the right. On the Western front, he wants to persuade the Left that patriotism, far from being a dirty word, is essential to our living together in harmony and peace, and that the nation-state remains an indispensable vehicle for the preservation of liberty and self-governance. I think it's clear which of the two is the more challenging

intellectual task. For the Left, with its traditional emphasis on fraternité, or the cultivation of human solidarity and communal values, along with its paradoxical gravitation toward supranational forms of political organization, the reality that such values require the backing of loyalty is particularly difficult to reconcile with an ethos of limitless criticism.

To say that we are a part of one another—or even to acknowledge that man is by nature a "political animal," thinking here of Aristotle and not of James Carville—is not merely to say that we should deliberate together. It is also to say that at some point, the discussion ceases and we make a commitment to one another to act together. Furthermore, it is to say that we cannot sustain serious, demanding, and long-term commitments to one another if those commitments are regarded as provisional and easily revoked for light and transient causes. We make an agreement and we agree to stand by it. Call it a contract, a covenant, or a constitution, it is the same general kind of commitment, a commitment not merely of the intellect but also of the will.

For any freely organized political undertaking, this vital qualification presents a difficulty. But for the Left, it becomes a profound dilemma. It is no accident, if I may put it this way, that the more attractive elements of the Left also tend to be the most schismatic and ineffectual, while the uglier ones tend to be the most disciplined and unified, in which solidarity becomes a byword for the silent obedience of the herd.

Todd Gitlin's political career began with the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) in its glory days, and his generation accomplished much more than perhaps it wanted to by "demystifying" the nation and popularizing the idea that all larger solidarities are merely pseudo-communities invented and imposed by nation-building elites that operate entirely with their own interests in mind. By doing so, it also made "the nation" into an entity unable to command the public's loyalty and support—and willingness to endure sacrifices—for much of anything at all, including the kind of far-reaching domestic transformations that are the Left's most cherished aspirations. The hermeneutic of suspicion knows no

boundaries, so what is true for the making of war is also true for Social Security or national health insurance or public-health measures in a pandemic or any other plans to deal with our problems on a national scale. Without some enduring and visceral love of country, and a sense of ourselves as united by a bond larger than the tribal one, but more specific and concrete than the bond of shared humanity, we cannot accomplish noble and worthwhile things together in its name. The fact is, the Left needs patriotism too, and the hypertrophied moral perfectionism of "woke" politics is the worst thing that could possibly have happened to progressive reform. As Michael Walzer sagely observed many years ago, critics must also be connected to the things they criticize, if their criticism is to be fruitful.

Along with a small number of others on the left, Gitlin recognized that it was a grievous error to have abandoned patriotism. His book was an effort to inch his way back toward an embrace of the national idea, without which the Left has nowhere to go, but to do so in ways that carefully avoid the embrace of "conservative" ideas of patriotism.

Smith has done far better than that, and although a man of the left-center, he is much friendlier to conservative understandings of patriotism than the somewhat more radical Gitlin was able to be. Although he does use the example of Donald Trump as a negative reference point helping to frame the book's argument as a two-front battle. It is one of the book's few weaknesses that Smith's clear abhorrence of the person Donald Trump prevents him from entering into a more detailed and sympathetic analysis of the sources of Trump's political popularity and the ways that those sources are echoed in discontents around the world—including now our neighbors to the north. Part of the way out of our current dilemma is going to involve the recognition that it is folly to try to muzzle or neutralize a huge number of our fellow citizens by calling them shameful names and pushing them to the margins of respectability.

But to be fair, that kind of analysis is not the sort of thing Smith is engaging in here, and I don't want to commit the cardinal sin of

reviewing a book that the author did not intend to write. He is a political theorist, not a historian or sociologist, and his main concern is the careful parsing of ideas. His book is largely a book about other books, texts, and theorists and far less about the interplay between those factors and the testimony of concrete events and persons themselves. There is value in that. And there is so much else that is positive and praiseworthy about this book, very much including the example set by its irenic tone and careful, civil manner, that this reviewer's verdict has to be nothing short of three cheers. What would be even better is to see this book become the seedbed of other books and movements that would seek to embody a robust version of the attractive ideals Smith puts forward. The floor is open.

Reflections on the Meaning (and Possibility) of Patriotism in the Contemporary (Dis)United States

Sanford V. Levinson
University of Texas–Austin

Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes
By Steven B. Smith. Yale University Press, 2021. Pp. 256. $28.00

Steven B. Smith's *Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes* is very much a book of and for our particular time. A quite slender book, it does not purport to offer a comprehensive theory of patriotism across vast times or space; instead, it is basically a heartfelt missive to his fellow Americans (and, perhaps, fellow academics) about what can be said about American patriotism at this particular juncture in our history, where serious people are discussing not only whether the United States will survive as a republican constitutional order, but even whether it will survive in its present form geographically. Indeed, if anything, the discussion has grown even more fraught since he wrote and published this book a few years ago. Several books across the political spectrum have recently been published that take the possibility of secessionism altogether seriously. One question raised by his book is what exactly constitutes us as members of the American political community; another is whether we are really committed to maintaining our identity as members of that particular polity.

Smith is clearly concerned that a mixture of multiculturalism and postmodernism—the former probably more of a genuine reality than the latter in the present intellectual moment—has eroded any genuine notion of patriotism. Prominent intellectuals like

George Kateb or Martha Nussbaum essentially deride the notion, the former in the name of Thoreauvian individualism, the latter evoking instead a commitment to a cosmopolitan identity as basically a citizen of the world. And the most prominent contemporary public purveyors of patriotism are often parochial "nationalists" committed to dubious notions of Making America Great Again or America First (or simply shouting out "USA, USA" at the Olympics); it is clear that Smith, altogether properly, does not want to be associated with the latter, even as he is critical of the former.

As an academic I have long been interested in the phenomenon of patriotism; perhaps even more to the point, as a child of the turbulent 1960s I often wonder exactly what that means in my own life. Many years ago, when Steve Macedo reviewed in *The New Republic* my 1988 book *Constitutional Faith,* he referred to me as a "patriot" even though (or perhaps because?) I was quite critical of the Madisonian tradition of constitutional "veneration." I preferred to cast my lot with Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson, both vigorous critics of any such veneration. What Macedo presumably recognized, though, was that I was indeed concerned with the future (as well as the past) of our country and believed that it was necessary to adopt a more Jeffersonian spirit of critique in order to serve our great national ends enunciated, for example, in the Preamble to the Constitution itself, or in the Declaration of Independence. Moreover, I concluded that book by writing of my visit to the Bicentennial Exhibit in Philadelphia in 1987; every visitor was given the opportunity to "sign the Constitution" and, presumably, reaffirm an identity as a loyal American defined by accepting its particular importance in structuring not only American government but also American identity. Although I hesitated, I did in fact add my signature. But that was a time that now seems long ago.

By 2003, when the National Constitution Center (for which I had served on an advisory committee) opened in Philadelphia, I rejected the same opportunity. One's visit to the Center concludes on entering the impressive "Signers' Hall," with its life-size statues of the delegates to the 1787 Convention; one is invited to reaffirm

one's membership in the American community by joining them, as it were, as signatories. This time I did not. A 2011 second edition of *Constitutional Faith* includes an afterword explaining why I had lost any faith in the Constitution; indeed, in 2022 I consider it to be a genuine threat to our national survival. But because I am genuinely concerned about our survival and wish the country—*my* country—well, does that make me any less of a patriot?

I am uncertain how Smith would describe me, given his own encomia to the Constitution. "Our legal code based on the Constitution has been elaborated," he writes altogether accurately, "over the course of our national existence by our most prominent lawyers, judges, and legislators." But that accurate description is followed immediately by a distinctly more normative sentence: "Americans can justly take pride that their legal system has survived intact for well over two centuries and today may yet stand as a bulwark against a resurgent populism."[1] He had earlier written that "[m]any Americans, if asked will say they take pride in their Constitution and their constitutional tradition. This pride in a text or a textual tradition forms the core of American patriotism." To be sure, we can argue about the meaning of the Constitution, "and the argument—our self-questioning character—is a core aspect of American patriotism. This is what makes ours a uniquely enlightened patriotism. This is the true meaning of American exceptionalism."[2]

I remain perplexed. Part of me wonders how Smith, or anyone else, could believe that our "legal system has survived intact for well over two centuries." Like Bruce Ackerman, Smith's colleague at Yale, I think this is a dangerous misreading of the actualities of our constitutional history, which features what the late Stephen Jay Gould might have labeled "punctuated equilibria" in which periods of apparent repose are interspersed with tectonic shifts and perhaps political tsunamis, including a civil war that killed roughly 750,000 persons. I fear that sentences like Smith's serve, whether intended or not, an ideological function: to blind Americans to the all-important history of significant change, some of its produced by "populist" movements like abolitionism and the civil rights

movement. As I argued in *Framed: America's 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance*, I am increasingly less interested in the kinds of debates about constitutional "meaning" that obsess the legal academy and more interested in—or even obsessed by—the *(un)wisdom* of a variety of aspects of the Constitution that present no real challenges of "interpretation," including, for starters, the allocation of equal voting power in the Senate or the sheer difficulty of amending the Constitution through Article V. No American should take pride in these vestiges of 1787.

So, I return to the central question, at least for me: Do I count as a "patriot" in Smith's universe? Perhaps yes, inasmuch as both of us identify in profound ways as "Americans" and not really as a deracinated "citizen of the world" with equal "concern and respect" for anyone and everyone living anywhere and everywhere. But no, if one is to take devotion to the United States Constitution, either in its 1787 form or even as amended—though not enough—in 2022, as a necessary condition of patriotism.

One problem I have with Smith's argument is what I find an insufficiently elaborated notion of what exactly he means by the Constitution and, therefore, the importance of being committed to it. But I have yet another important reservation: the central exemplar of enlightened American patriotism for Smith is Abraham Lincoln. "No one," we are told, "has captured the meaning of enlightened patriotism more beautifully than Abraham Lincoln, who gave American constitutional democracy its highest and most articulate expression. In his speeches and writings, Lincoln put forward a vision of American identity that brings out the principal basis of patriotism."[3]

Here, too, I can be said to share Smith's focus, perhaps even obsession, with Lincoln. This past year I have taught "reading courses" at the University of Texas School of Law and Harvard Law School on Lincoln—and Frederick Douglass. I certainly agree that no one professing to understand America can avoid grappling with our sixteenth president. But, frankly, I discern a far more complex, more troublesome Abraham Lincoln than Smith appears to find, at least in this volume. Mario Cuomo famously said that politicians

campaign in poetry but govern in prose. It is not a coincidence that most evocations of Lincoln's greatness involve what might be described as his "poetic" efforts, including, for example, the Gettysburg Address and, even more certainly, the Second Inaugural Address. It is specialists who tend to concentrate instead of his actual decisions as a practicing politician, whether as a candidate for higher office or as president of the United States.

Consider in this context Frederick Douglass's great speech delivered "on the Occasion of the Unveiling of the Freedmen's Monument in Memory of Abraham Lincoln" on April 14, 1876, the eleventh anniversary of Lincoln's assassination. As one would expect, Douglass offered praise of Lincoln, but it is distinctly dual-edged. "It must be admitted," Douglass informs his audience, and "truth compels me to admit, even here in the presence of the monument we have erected to his memory, Abraham Lincoln was not, in the fullest sense of the world, either *our* man or *our* model. In his interests, in his associations, in his habits of thought, and in his prejudices, he was a white man. He was preeminently the white man's president, entirely devoted to the welfare of white men" (emphasis added). A truly inclusive country—and a proponent of a twenty-first-century notion of patriotism—would recognize Lincoln's limits as well as his greatness. Another Yale colleague of Smith's, David Blight, begins his great biography of Douglass by quoting and discussing this speech as depicting, perhaps, what W. E. B. Du Bois would later call the "double consciousness" that all African Americans must live with and assess. To what extent does the term "We the People" truly include, on equal terms, each and every one of us?

Was Douglass correct in his assessment of Lincoln? Lincoln was, after all, until very late in his life, a proponent of so-called "colonization" of American Blacks—whether they could truly be "African-Americans" was uncertain—because of his belief, very similar to that of Jefferson's, that Blacks and whites could not amicably share the vast spaces of the American polity together. This is exactly what he told a gathering of African-American leaders from the District of Columbia in 1862 as he urged them to lead a

movement that would settle parts of Panama. And if Douglass was in fact correct, does this cast light on the ever more bitter controversy over the "1619 Project" and the attempts to answer it not only by Donald Trump's "1776 Report," which similarly valorizes Lincoln (and even selected aspects of Douglass), but also by far more temperate historians like Princeton's Sean Wilentz? Is it true that any American patriot must recognize the extent to which white supremacy infects almost every aspect of our national history, including the thoughts and actions of even our greatest figures within what is accurately called "American civil religion"?

To be sure, not every "white supremacist" supports the Ku Klux Klan, and Douglass recognizes Lincoln's sincere hatred of slavery and his willingness to refer to Douglass in public as his "friend." That is surely important. Lincoln could have been far worse, more like the man he chose to be his vice president, Andrew Johnson, in the belief that this Unionist Democrat would aid his reelection chances in 1864. But Smith is not praising Lincoln as merely far better than the average white man of his time.

One need not support the removal of the monument that Douglass so eloquently dedicated in order to recognize that Abraham Lincoln, like the author of the Declaration of Independence Thomas Jefferson, or each and every one of our national heroes, is radically imperfect, and not only because "to err is human." Theirs was what might be called a "structured imperfection," inasmuch as success within American politics has always required presentation, whether overt or tacit, of being "the white man's president." Today, perhaps except for Donald Trump, few would describe themselves as devoted "entirely" to the interests of whites. But let us not kid ourselves. Barack Obama, for whatever complex set of reasons, certainly did very little to teach his fellow Americans about the actual history of white supremacy and the concomitant duty to adopt political programs to try to alleviate it. Quite likely, he would have been perceived as "an angry Black man" and denied the office to which he aspired. And, of course, as with Lincoln, one can easily point to many good things he did as president. But to stop there, to take refuge that no one is perfect

(including the author of this review or anyone reading it) is ultimately to dodge the kinds of conversations we must have—and actions following from those conversations—if we are, I am tempted to say, "genuine patriots" committed to the vision of an egalitarian America that Smith, to his credit, embraces.

Patriotism as Reflection *and* Choice

Jeremy D. Bailey
University of Oklahoma

Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes
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In September of 1823, James Madison wrote his friend Thomas Jefferson with some advice. The advice had to do with rival camps claiming credit for American independence. In New England, Timothy Pickering and others were arguing that authorship of the Declaration of Independence did not matter because there was nothing in that document that had not already been said by James Otis a decade earlier. In Virginia, the allies of Richard Henry Lee, the person who proposed independence in the Continental Congress, were claiming that the credit for the Revolution belonged to Lee, not Jefferson, because, after all, Jefferson had simply copied his ideas from John Locke and others. In this context, Madison advised Jefferson that "the object" of the Declaration "was not to discover new truths." Rather, the Declaration was meant to be a "lucid communication of human Rights" that would be "condensed" in a "style & tone more appropriate to the great occasion, & to the spirit of the American people." Readers of this journal will no doubt notice the similarity between Madison's letter to Jefferson in 1823, and Jefferson's famous 1825 letter to Richard Henry Lee's relative, Henry Lee.[4]

In that letter, Jefferson explained that the "object" of the Declaration was not to "find out new principles, never thought of before." Rather, it was "to place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent." It is not surprising that Jefferson's rendering of the object is much better than Madison's. Jefferson was always superior to

Madison as a writer. But what is perhaps surprising is that Jefferson backed away from the curious language suggested by his friend and confidant. Rather than declaring "a communication of human rights," Jefferson spoke of commanding the assent of humankind and doing so by being both an "expression of the American mind" *and* "by giving to that expression the proper tone and spirit."[5] Where Madison emphasizes human rights, Jefferson Americanizes the project and then emphasizes the process by which people give their assent. In this version, the Declaration creates as much as it announces.

In *Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes*, Yale political theorist Steven B. Smith wants to save patriotism by locating it as the moderate mean between the two extremes of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Nationalism is undesirable because it is "exclusionary," and as the German jurist Carl Schmitt saw, it is grounded in the necessary war between friends, who are included, and enemies, who are not.[6] However, for Smith, cosmopolitanism is also undesirable because it "uproots" people from the natural attachments that give life meaning and welcomes meritocratic technocracy as a replacement way of life.[7] Smith argues that patriotism is preferable to each, but only when it is rightly understood. It is "closer to civic piety," which demands "reverence for the sources of one's being."[8] But this piety is "enlightened," in the sense that it demands the best of the nation, and what Smith calls "ethos patriotism," or patriotism of both "thinking and feeling."[9] It is loyalty to a principle but a principle understood in the context—a "history and tradition"—of a particular nation.[10]

Even though Smith presents patriotism as a mean, his book is tilted toward saving patriotism from one of the extremes. That is, the book is clearly meant to save patriotism from the self-identified "Patriots" of the far right and from the flag waiving associated with modern nationalism, or even white nationalism, more than it is meant to defend patriotism against cosmopolitanism. It thus offers an admonition to the young patriot who does not understand the danger of his own love of country. This young patriot likely does not realize that his love of country has been corrupted, corrupted in

that the "face of national conservativism is no longer Friedrich Hayek but Martin Heidegger."[11]

In the context of the United States, Smith argues, his preferred ethos patriotism requires love of particular aspects of the American constitutional tradition. These aspects include equality,[12] rule of law,[13] limited government,[14] pluralism and respect for diversity,[15] culture and the arts,[16] invention and discovery,[17] economic development and opportunity,[18] individualism,[19] faith and hope,[20] and exceptionalism.[21] Smith's patriotism is a patriotism that is meant to be inclusive. It can accommodate James Madison, Abraham Lincoln, Walt Whitman, Martin Luther King Jr., and Bruce Springsteen. Smith's version of patriotism thus offers a welcome way to talk about America, and to love it, without deciding whether America is a creed or a culture. It is both. America is an agreement to live by a principle that is necessarily aspirational, and it is an accidental inheritance of assumptions and attitudes that are English in origin. It is both an idea and a history. Rightly understood, patriotism is chastened by its principles and its past.

However attractive this idea of patriotism might be for those wishing to defend an idea of patriotism, it might miss something about patriotism itself, or at least it might mischaracterize the kind of patriotism as it has presented itself in the idea of the United States and the liberal tradition out of which it grew. In my view, what is missing in Smith's account is the possibility that the particularities of place are ones of creation and choice. In other words, patriotism honors not only what we have inherited but also what we have built and, in the case of the immigrant, what we have chosen. This is to say that patriotism in the United States has to deal with the stipulation that consent is a necessary condition for rightful political authority. Consent is not the same thing as a discussion of the best way of life, and when understood by liberal and American premises, it is prior to and more important than what is best for the nation.

Consider the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. As many scholars have noted, the first paragraph asserts that "one people" need to "declare the causes" when they decide to separate

themselves from "another," but it never explains, as the historian Brian Steele puts it, just when it is that one people becomes two. Does it happen overnight?[22] Steele argues that we have to look elsewhere, specifically to the "Summary View of the Rights of British America," for Jefferson's own solution to this puzzle. In that document, Jefferson linked the settling of the North America to the settling of England. Just as the English built a nation in "the wilds of America," their "Saxon ancestors" had "left their native wilds and woods in the north of Europe, has possessed themselves of the island of Britain, then less charged with inhabitants, and established there that system of laws which has so long been the glory and protection of that country."[23] These Saxon emigrants, like the British settlers of North America, were acting under "a right which nature has given to all men"—namely, "departing from the country in which chance, not choice, has placed them, of going in quest of new habitations, and of there establishing new societies, under such laws and regulations as to them shall seem most likely to promote the pubic happiness."[24] What we see here is that Britain and America had similar foundings in that both arose from the exercise of natural right. This exercise had two components: choice and creation. Choice is instantiated in the act of emigration, and creation in the act of settlement and lawmaking.

What is worth noticing is that Jefferson goes out of his way to notice that choice and creation are done by individuals. It was the "blood" and "fortune" spent by particular persons who decided the effort was worth their while: "America was conquered, and her settlements made, and firmly established, at the expense of individuals, and not of the British public."

It is impossible to miss the fact that Jefferson says America was "conquered" by settlers from Britain. Later, in his Second Inaugural, Jefferson acknowledged that the "aboriginal inhabitants" of North America were "overwhelmed" and "driven" by a current of English immigrants. These original inhabitants wanted only to enjoy their natural right to be left alone in liberty.[25] Jefferson, whose hidden hand was arguably responsible for pushing some of these original inhabitants all the way "into the stony mountains," never attempted

to reconcile the right of the settler to emigrate and the right of the aborigine to be left alone.[26] His somber "commiseration" in the Second Inaugural notes only the inevitability and the injustice of the historical fact.

Perhaps this makes a return to Jefferson and his way of thinking unattractive for recovery today, but it is nevertheless worth remembering that an inheritance is made before it can be bequeathed. In the context of the United States, it included writing constitutions, defeating the British in two wars, and then appropriating and settling the West. This settling continues, as it does in the life cycle of every nation, until it ends.

But this act of creation requires a choice, and in the context of America, it required the choice to take up arms against not only the British but also the Confederacy and then against imperial ambitions by Germany, Japan, and others. As we have seen again and again, the decision to make war, even to defend one's country, is not a foregone conclusion. Not every people have their George Washington.

It also requires a choice to arrive and then stay. In the beginning, migration came from a handful of places in Northern Europe, but with the exception of enslaved persons, the driving idea was that consent—or choice—formed part of the bargain. In the mind of Jefferson, to be an American was to make a declaration that one was an American, a radical idea that destabilized the British navy and made the War of 1812 more or less unavoidable. This is not the same thing as "love it or leave it," but there is the presumption going back to John Locke that one's country is, in the final analysis, a choice that is in fact an act of consent. Today, the border remains busy with people coming to America.

To be sure, early Americans differed over the motivations for this choice. Jefferson believed that civil and religious liberty, combined with more or less free land, would be attractive to Europeans looking for a better deal. Alexander Hamilton disagreed, arguing instead that the cost of emigration required the promise of a better economic life and, therefore, of a more productive economy. Manufacturing, not land and liberty, would be the

enticement for people to choose to come to America. Jefferson and Hamilton undoubtedly had rival conceptions of America, but the point here is that they also had rival conceptions of the choice to be an American. But they also agreed that that they did not have to settle these questions—whether to be either an Athens or a Sparta—and instead attempted to relegate them to mere partisan contestation among factions. This partisan contestation continues, but somewhere along the way the two seemingly rival conceptions of the best way of life, the appeal of John Wayne and Henry Ford, have both become necessary parts of the choice that is America.

Part of the bargain with the principle of consent is that what is best for the nation might be less desirable than what I can live with. This means that patriotism for patriots remains necessarily value neutral on the most important things or, rather, that patriots regard the choice to be patriotic as the most valuable decision a person can make and so they refuse to be neutral about that. On the first page of the *Federalist Papers*, Hamilton predicted that the question facing Americans in 1787 would decide whether government by "reflection and choice" was even possible.[27] Smith has written an important book reminding would-be patriots about the *reflection* part of that experiment. Now someone needs to write a book about the other part.

Patriotism, Grateful and Resentful

Yiftah Elazar*
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes
By Steven B. Smith. Yale University Press, 2021. Pp. 256. $28.00

I once ran into the political theorist George Kateb on a train. The hour was late, and civility suggested that I leave him to his ruminations. But I was a graduate student taken by his brilliant critique of patriotism and resolved to get answers to pressing questions.[28] What about the love of country that Richard Price describes in his *Discourse of the Love of Our Country* (1789), I asked—a passion to enlighten, emancipate, and improve the community of one's fellow citizens, distinguished from a perverse sense of superiority over others and desire to dominate them?[29] If only patriotism looked like that, I recall Kateb saying, I could probably live with it.

In *Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes*, Steven B. Smith makes a stand for a patriotism that Americans can not only live with but also, he claims, cannot live without. The intellectual and political horizon of this book is darkened by two armies: on the left, a heterogeneous mass of resentful multiculturalists and cool cosmopolitans, patriotism's "enemies"; on the right, a horde of aggressive and exclusionary nationalists, "its overzealous friends."[30] Armed with impressive erudition, a clear and engaging prose style, and devotion to his ideal of America, Smith carves out and defends a middle ground. The result is a vindication of patriotism against its detractors; a reflection on what it needs to look like in order to qualify as morally praiseworthy; an interpretation of what it means

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to be an American patriot; and a call to Americans to embrace and quietly take pride in their unique form of patriotism. Drawing on a wealth of intellectual resources from Plutarch through Abraham Lincoln to *The Godfather*, Smith's book makes for an instructive and compelling read.

Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes makes a commendable contribution to the literature on the meaning and value of patriotism. Conceptions of patriotism range over a variety of attitudes and objects. The patriotic attitude has been associated, among other things, with self-love and charity, allegiance and dissent, pride and shame. The object of patriotism, the *patria*, has been described as an ancestral land, a republic, a cosmopolis, a constitution, a nation. From the moral perspective, patriotism has been variously treated as a virtue, a morally indifferent partiality, a mistake.

Smith follows Alasdair MacIntyre both in treating patriotism as a virtue and in defining it as loyalty to a particular country or nation. Loyalty—not merely an emotional attachment, but a cultivated habit of devotion, which becomes a formative part of one's identity—is an admirable quality, as long as it does not smother one's moral judgment. But in MacIntyre's account, patriotic loyalty is illiberal and dangerous. He argues that patriotism makes sense only within the particularist morality of a national community, a morality that he believes to be deeply incompatible with a liberal commitment to universal moral rules. He argues that patriotism implies an *uncritical* loyalty to some aspects of the national project, and this serves as a permanent source of moral danger.[31] Smith transfigures MacIntyre's patriotic loyalty into an enlightened and domesticated virtue. His account of patriotism combines particularism and universalism, tradition and critical reflection, conservatism and liberalism. He is partly inspired by a strand of Enlightenment writers who sought to modernize and humanize the warmongering and self-renouncing legacy of Spartan patriotism. Partly, he is inspired by an ideal of America as a creedal nation, a country based on a set of universal principles like equality and pluralism and on a tradition of rational deliberation about them.

I have found much to admire in this account of patriotism. In what follows, I would like to probe some aspects of Smith's treatment of several issues: enlightened patriotism, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and the American progressive left.

Smith's account of enlightened patriotism can be situated in a genre of writing about what patriotism needs to look like in order to qualify as morally defensible or praiseworthy. Other contributions to this genre have outlined "moderate," "constitutional," "republican," "constructive," and "impartial" versions of patriotism.[32] An obvious challenge to all these is the one that I take Kateb to have raised in our encounter on the train: they fail to capture the nature and function of patriotism in social reality. Patriotism is much too often, perhaps more often than not, unreflective and excessive, a source and an instrument of exclusion, oppression, and unjustified killing and dying. Smith tends to put everything that is excessive about patriotism in the basket of nationalism, but the excesses of patriotism predate the rise of nationalism, which is, as he rightly says, a modern ideology. The dark side of patriotism, which is arguably inherent to it, is insufficiently illuminated in this book.

Relatedly, the distinction Smith makes between patriotism and nationalism may be overdrawn. Following in the footsteps of George Orwell and Maurizio Viroli, Smith separates patriotism, understood as a moderate devotion to a particular way of life, from nationalism, understood as an ideology of domestic homogeneity and international superiority.[33] The neatness of the distinction is attractive. At the very least, it opens our eyes to the fact that patriotism can, in principle, be distinguished from nationalism. But to come back to my point about social reality, it has become quite challenging to disentangle patriotism from nationalism. The modern object of patriotism is the nation-state, and the question is how thick and exclusionary one's idea of the nation is. Smith presents us with a paradigmatic model of a relatively inclusive nation and a relatively inclusive patriotism. Yet he also argues that "American patriotism, like America itself, is exceptional."[34] It remains insufficiently clear where this leaves those who are inspired by Smith's

account of enlightened patriotism and whom fortune has not favored with being American. Moreover, looking at American patriotism in the Age of Trump, one worries that rather than serving as a beacon of inclusiveness to the world, Americans are taking a page from more exclusionary forms of national patriotism.

Smith's reply to such concerns would seem to be that whatever reservations we may have about the nature and function of patriotism in social reality, there is no delete button we can press in order to get rid of it. Our only viable option is to try to improve it. "So long as we remain political animals, we cannot avoid patriotism," he says. "The question is only what form it will take. Will it be harsh and barbarous, or humane and enlightened?"[35] As I read Smith, even if there was a delete button, he would not press it, because he sees patriotism as one of the commitments that endow life with meaning and beauty. But even those of us whose vision of the good life is different may still buy into the argument that patriotism, as a social phenomenon, is not going anywhere, and it would be a mistake to leave its mobilizing power to ideological rivals. In my view, *Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes* is at its most persuasive and valuable in trying to wrest patriotism from the hands of American nationalists.

This leads me to the other "extreme" from which patriotism needs to be reclaimed, where Smith places cosmopolitanism and the new progressive and multicultural left. He offers a critical but respectful treatment of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism. He is less charitable toward "the new cosmopolitanism," which is depicted either as detached, cool, heartless and joyless, or "difficult to translate into meaningful action,"[36] or as the attitude of the members of a globalized and meritocratic class, who seem to care little for their fellow citizens, or for anyone else, for that matter. But this seems to conflate the attitude of globalized elites with the cosmopolitan ethic of commitment to humanity, and there is an abundance of passionate activism for the cause of humanity. Instead of pitting patriotic loyalty against the attitudes of the participants of the Davos conference or Rick Blane from *Casablanca* in his moments of disillusioned indifference, it could have been

interesting to pit it against the ethical commitments of Mother Theresa and Greta Thunberg.

Smith has even less patience for the new progressive and multicultural left, which he accuses of fostering identity and grievance politics and undermining the sense of commitment to a common enterprise and a shared way of life. He compares "the call that Black Lives Matter" to "the call to Make America Great Again."[37] There may be a similarity in that Americans on both sides of this comparison feel betrayed by their country, but this is also a false equivalence between those who protest against oppression and those who defend their right to domination. Activists for Black Lives Matter are fighting for a more just and inclusive America. Their questioning of many aspects of America as it exists may not sit easily with Smith's understanding of patriotism as "a sentiment of gratitude and appreciation for who we are and what has made us."[38] But ironically, many of the achievements for which some patriots are grateful are owed to less grateful and sometimes rightly resentful individuals and movements that fought for a radically different country, a *patria* not yet in existence.[39]

One is left wondering about the casting of the protagonists in the drama laid out in *Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes*. Should enlightened patriots really think of nationalists as their overzealous friends? With friends like these, who needs enemies? Should they think of cosmopolitans and progressive activists as the enemies of enlightened patriotism? At the risk of sounding naïve, is it really impossible to imagine a political friendship between patriots of the kind that Smith has in mind, cosmopolitans, and progressive activists, on the basis of a shared commitment to the principles of equality and pluralism? After all, in the valiant battle against the rising tide of populist and exclusionary nationalism, one cannot have too many friends, however grateful, joyless, or resentful they may be.

Make America What America Must Become: On Steven B. Smith's *Reclaiming Patriotism*

Nicholas Buccola
Linfield University

Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes
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In his famous "Letter to My Nephew on the One Hundredth Anniversary of Emancipation," James Baldwin declared we must "make America what America must become." Later in the same letter, Baldwin wrote that he and his fourteen-year-old nephew knew that "the country is celebrating one hundred years of freedom one hundred years too soon." The key to making America into the sort of country that could rightfully celebrate its freedom, Baldwin argued, was love. But love of what? Love of country? Love of one's countrymen? And just what do we mean by love?

These are some of the questions at the heart of Steven B. Smith's *Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes*. The book showcases many of the virtues Smith has embodied as a teacher and scholar for years. His writing is clear, often compelling, occasionally playful, and always provocative. For anyone looking for a brief primer on the history of Western ideas of patriotism and an introduction to the "state of play" in contemporary debates over the idea, Smith's book is a great place to start.

But Smith's aims in *Reclaiming Patriotism* go far beyond the descriptive. In addition, Smith has a normative case to make, and those familiar with his work will once again find him showcasing virtues that have become synonymous with his political style. When

I think of where Smith fits in the intellectual firmament, I place his star alongside figures like Michael Oakeshott and Isaiah Berlin. He has a skeptical cast of mind, and his politics are moderate in the best possible sense. He is not in the business of offering banal platitudes. Instead, his skepticism of extremism provides a foundation from which he offers sharp criticisms of those he thinks have taken things too far in one direction or the other.

And so in this book we find Smith "reclaiming patriotism" from those who have misappropriated it on the "nationalist" right and from those have apparently abandoned it on the "multiculturalist" left. The nationalists rely on us-them and friend-enemy framing as the bases for identity and political morality. They tend to overemphasize the particularity "conferred by ethnicity, race, or religion" as the basis for an agonistic politics of belonging.[40] We've seen this show before and it does not end well. On the left, patriotism has been deemed thoroughly "uncool," Smith argues, and in its place "multiculturalists" have "fostered a sense of grievance politics" and "globalist elites" have come to "regard things like place and country simply as a cost of doing business."[41]

In between these two extremes, Smith defends a middle way, which he variously calls an "enlightened," "creedal," or "constitutional" patriotism. Patriotism, on Smith's account, is more than an idea or set of ideas; it is an "ethos." By this, he means that his conception is "a manner of both thinking and feeling." Smith's patriotism emphasizes the virtues of loyalty, gratitude, and respect. Loyalty, he says, is "the first virtue of social institutions." But loyalty to what? Gratitude and respect for what? Smith sums it up in this way. Enlightened patriotism requires "due regard for our collective values, what we look up to as a people. It is an expression of our highest ideals and commitments, not only to what we are, but also to what we might be. It is devotion to the republic and the way of life for which it stands."[42] Toward the end of the book, Smith elaborates on the ideas for which he thinks the American republic stands: equality, the rule of law, limited government, individualism, pluralism and respect for diversity, an appreciation for culture and the arts, celebration of invention and discovery, commitment to

economic development and opportunity, faith and hope, and a belief in American exceptionalism.[43] The hero of Smith's patriotism is Abraham Lincoln, whose patriotic ethos was egalitarian, aspirational, and inclusive. If we were to proclaim on a bumper sticker the patriotic ethos Smith endorses, it might read, simply, WWLD?[44]

I found a great deal of Smith's argument to be compelling. I find his vision to be far more humane than that of the neo-nationalists currently on the march. I don't know if Smith sees himself as engaged in a struggle for the soul of the American Right, but in so far that he does, I sure hope his side wins. I am slightly less convinced by Smith's critique of the Left and his book has forced me to grapple with why. When we are confronted by an argument with which we disagree, our eyes seem much better able to see the warts we seldom notice when confronted with an argument we already accept. So I bristled when I found Smith leaning on stock phrases like "grievance politics" in his attacks on the Left, and I suppose some right-wing readers shifted in their seats when he mocked the latest absurdities uttered at a National Conservatism Conference. And so, I found myself wondering about the gap between Smith and me, and I decided to stare into that gap to see what I found.

I came to Smith's book as a teacher and writer of African American political thought, and it is from that point of view that I offer some criticisms of his thesis. Most of my work has been on Frederick Douglass and James Baldwin, so in what follows I lean on each of them to help me think through Smith's arguments. In my conclusion, I consider the implications of my encounter with Smith for how I conceive of my own patriotism.

Douglass comes up a few times in *Reclaiming Patriotism*. The first substantive mention of Douglass is in Smith's intriguing discussion of "cool." The concept of coolness is introduced in his critique of the "ethic of the cosmopolitan citizen," whom he describes as "someone who attempts to embody the common features of humanity and not any individual nation, tribe or state." The cosmopolitan, Smith says, is "cool" in the sense that she adopts a stance of "detached irony"; she withholds "emotional

commitment" to most things, especially her country. To explain the idea, Smith creates a list of cool and uncool public figures, pairing each with *his* (they are all men) most relevant contemporary. In the cool list, there is Frederick Douglass; opposite him, among the uncool: the hero of *Reclaiming Patriotism*, Abraham Lincoln. When Douglass comes up later in the book, he is identified as part of a tradition of "patriotic resistance at its best," and Smith indicates in his conclusion that Douglass's autobiographies ought to be part of the canon of great patriotic texts.

Smith's identification of Douglass with a tradition of "cool" and a tradition of patriotic resistance is intriguing and seems to capture parts of the truth (though I wonder about the tensions between the two claims). Douglass was, in a sense, a citizen of the world. Some of his most important development as a thinker and political actor occurred when he left the United States, and he certainly saw the struggle for liberty in universalist, global terms. And there was a period in Douglass's career when he believed "scorching irony" was the right "stance" for him to have toward his country.[45] And yet Douglass was also the master of what Smith calls "patriotic resistance"; no one was better able to deliver stinging jeremiads lambasting his fellow countrymen for failing to live up to their professed ideals.

Like Lincoln's, Douglass's patriotism was egalitarian, aspirational, and inclusive. And yet, prior to the Civil War there was undoubtedly a gap between the two men. The gap might be conceived as a disagreement about patriotism: What did true love of country require in a land with millions of slaves? But it might also be conceived as posing another question: What if one's commitment to that for which the Republic ought to stand is at odds with the constitutional forms and traditions before one's very eyes? To put it rather too simply, but not unfairly: What to the slave was Lincoln's prewar patriotism? To put it more broadly: What to the slave is *any* conception of patriotism that is not committed to his emancipation? Douglass, of course, came to appreciate Lincoln, but if we want to really probe deeply about the meaning and value of patriotism, we should not limit our reflections to the eventual

convergence of the reformer and the statesman. Instead, we need to dwell in 1858, 1859, 1860, and early 1861, when Lincoln did all he could to distance his political "brand" from radicals like Douglass and Douglass slammed Lincoln's "inhuman coldness" and "weakness, timidity, and conciliation toward the tyrants and traitors."[46]

It is a bit too easy and tidy to say we needed figures like Douglass *and* figures like Lincoln to make emancipation a reality. Whatever philosophical and historical truths are contained in such a view, it too easily allows us to dodge a hard question. Whose antebellum love is more defensible, Lincoln's or Douglass's? I'll take Lincoln's love over Stephen Douglas's any day, but Frederick Douglass is another story. And I choose Douglass not because he was "cool"—though he undoubtedly was—but because he was right. The fact is that Lincoln's patriotism was, for a time, consistent with the enslavement of millions of human beings; Douglass's was not. If the "principles" of equality and freedom for all human beings are that to which we owe our deepest loyalty, then Lincoln's prewar patriotism was insufficient. The antebellum United States was not nearly lovely enough to be worthy of Douglass's love, and we've fallen short of worthiness all too often since.

As I read *Reclaiming Patriotism*, I was rereading Baldwin and I could not help but wonder what Baldwin would make of Smith's arguments. Baldwin is so eminently quotable, and one of the most popular lines that makes the rounds on social media is on the subject of patriotism. In his 1955 "Autobiographical Notes," he wrote, "I love America more than any other country in the world, and, exactly for this reason, I insist on the right to criticize her perpetually."[47] Baldwin's claim to "love America" suggests he might be considered part of what Smith calls the great American tradition of "patriotic resistance," but the truth is more complicated. By the end of his life, Baldwin was saying things like "I don't see anything in American life—for myself—to aspire to. Nothing at all. It's all so very false, so shallow, so plastic, so morally and ethically corrupt."[48] Even if Baldwin still had some love for the country, I suspect he would have been reluctant to call himself a "patriot" in Reagan's

America. To make sense of why, we have to ponder what Baldwin meant by love and, for the purposes of this engagement with Smith, consider how that understanding of love provides a useful lens through which to view the idea of patriotism as an ethos of constitutional loyalty.

Love is the most important and complex of ideas in Baldwin's thought, so for the purposes of this essay I will limit myself to his exploration of the concept in his 1962 essays "The Creative Process" and "Down at Cross." "The Creative Process" is a short piece in which Baldwin considers what it means to be an artist and what the artist's role is in society. The artist, in his view, is the person who through acts of creativity helps to "illuminate the darkness" of the self and the world around us. The artist's primary responsibilities are to "reveal all that he can possibly discover concerning the mystery of the human being" and to "drive to the heart of every answer and expose the question that it hides." This is all pretty heady and interesting stuff, but what's love got to do with it? Throughout the essay, Baldwin juxtaposes the artist with "responsible actors in society—the politicians, legislators, educators, scientists, et cetera"—who are charged with the essential tasks of creating "a bulwark against the inner and the outer chaos, literally, in order to make life bearable and to keep the human race alive." Baldwin argues that the "nature of the artist's responsibility to his society" is that "he must never cease warring with it, for its sake and for his own." But here's the kicker: "Societies never know it, but the war of an artist with his society is a lover's war, and he does, at his best, what lovers do which is to reveal the beloved to himself, and with that revelation, make freedom real."[49]

The general posture of Baldwin's love of country is critical. His love is a tough love, but it is a love meant to reveal and liberate. He is there to drive to the heart of every answer to pose tough questions. Imagining him reading Smith, I found myself seeing Baldwin wondering, for example, about the idea of patriotism as a "love of one's own; the customs, habits, manners, and traditions that make us who and what we are." Baldwin might ask, "Whose customs, habits, manners, and traditions" do you have in mind? How many

of these things can meaningfully be described as "American," rather than as belonging to something more particular? Even something as *national* as devotion to the Constitution, Baldwin might add, takes on a distinctive regional flavor throughout American history. In "Faulkner and Desegregation," Baldwin points out that Faulkner ("among so many others!") "clings to two entirely antithetical doctrines, two legends, two histories." He simultaneously claims that he cares deeply about "the beliefs and the principles expressed in the Constitution" *and* "is committed to a society that has not yet dared to free itself of the necessity of naked and brutal oppression."[50]

When Baldwin himself thought about what he loves most about the customs, habits, manners, and traditions of the country, he had something rather different from Faulkner's conception and rather more specific than the country in mind. In "Down at the Cross," Baldwin described the ways in which his life and the lives of so many like him were dominated by "bottomlessly cruel" individuals, ideas, and institutions in Harlem, before saying, "But I cannot leave it at that." The reason Baldwin could not leave his reflections on life in Harlem in the late 1930s and early 1940s as simply a tale of domination and oppression is because he also found things to love in the experience. "Perhaps we were, all of us—pimps, whores, racketeers, church members, and children—bound together by the nature of our oppression, the specific and peculiar complex of risks we had to run; if so, within these limits we achieved with each other a freedom that was close to love."[51] Baldwin goes on to describe parties "where rage and sorrow sat in the darkness and did not stir, and we ate and drank and laughed and danced and forgot all about 'the man.' We had the liquor, the chicken, the music, and each other, and had no need to pretend to be what we were not."[52] What is this love Baldwin is describing here? Is it love of country? I think not. Can we blame him?

Elsewhere, Baldwin elaborates on this idea when reflecting on his time living abroad (mostly in Paris) from 1948 to 1957. "In the years in Paris," he writes, "I had never been homesick for anything American—neither waffles, ice cream, hot dogs, baseball,

majorettes, movies, nor the Empire State Building, nor Coney Island, nor the Statue of Liberty, nor the *Daily News*, nor Times Square." What he did miss was far more specific. "I missed Harlem Sunday mornings and fried chicken and biscuits, I missed the music, I missed the style—that style possessed by no other people in the world." The *people* were always at the center of Baldwin's love. "I missed the way the dark face closes," he continues, "the way dark eyes watch, and the way, when a dark face opens, a light seems to go everywhere."[53] Is this patriotism? Is it something else? If it is something else, does it capture something truer about what we love about our "home" than love of country?

In "Down at the Cross," Baldwin took this argument in a more explicitly political direction when he called on the man who imagined himself to be white "to become black," to "become part of that suffering and dancing country that he now watches wistfully from the heights of his lonely power." He calls on this man to come to terms with his history and the history of the country, which includes not only a history of "death and humiliation; fear by day and night; fear as deep as the marrow of the bone," but also a history of "improbable aristocrats—the only genuine aristocrats this country has produced"—"that unsung army of black men and women who trudged down back lanes and entered back doors" to make the world a little bit more human for the next generation. Of these heroes, Baldwin says, "I say 'this country' because their frame of reference was totally American. They were hewing out of the mountain of white supremacy the stone of their individuality."[54] Although Baldwin's emphasis in "Down at the Cross" is on African American history, there is no reason why his argument can't be extended to other experiences so often left out of the "mainstream" of American history. So much of the meaning of the country is to be found at the "margins," and so too might be the wisdom necessary for our redemption.

I could go on, but my hope is that the questions Baldwin presents for Smith's thesis are clear enough. For Baldwin, the question about any -ism—theism, patriotism, cosmopolitanism—was always this: How does this way of thinking, feeling, and acting

in the world contribute to the "freedom and fulfillment" of real human beings?[55] I think his take on Smith's argument might be best captured by substituting "patriotism" for "God" in one of the most famous passages from "Down at the Cross": "If the concept of [patriotism] has any validity or any use, it can only be to make us larger, freer, and more loving. If [patriotism] cannot do this, then it is time we got rid of [it]."[56]

On reflection, I find myself somewhere between Douglass and Baldwin on the question of patriotism. On some days, I am filled with Douglass's hopefulness that the country might one day live up to its creed and be redeemed. On other days, I am haunted by Baldwin's admission—expressed after the murders Medgar Evers, Malcolm X, and Martin Luther King Jr. (among so many others)—that he "could scarcely be deluded by Americans anymore" even as he demanded of Americans "a generosity, a clarity, and a nobility which they did not dream of demanding of themselves."[57] And that's just it: we have to love ourselves and one another enough to look unflinchingly at our history and take responsibility for it. Only a country willing to do that can be worthy of our love.

Steven B. Smith on Patriotism and Nationalism

Michael Walzer
Institute for Advanced Study

Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes
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I am an admirer of Steven B. Smith's book on patriotism and a believer in the value of American patriotism as he describes it. I am uncertain, however, about the distinction that Smith draws between patriotism and nationalism. His version of the distinction seems to require adjectives: enlightened patriotism is contrasted with illiberal nationalism. Now it may be true that patriotism tends toward enlightenment and nationalism tends toward illiberalism. But I want to look for a distinction that doesn't depend on those adjectives—not one that is less evaluative, but rather one that acknowledges the possibility of unenlightened patriotism and liberal nationalism.

Is there an American nationalism? Perhaps not; an American nation may be in formation, but I don't think it yet exists, and this makes Smith's argument especially important. There is a sub-American nationalism—"white nationalism"—which excludes more than a third of American citizens and is certainly illiberal. But I can imagine a liberal nationalism in other countries, those where membership includes the entire nation and where the members recognize the rights of other nations both within and without. Giuseppe Mazzini's nationalism is a good example: he founded Young Italy and then helped in the formation of Young Poland, Young Germany, and Young Switzerland. Nationalism was definitely liberal when it was Young.

How shall we draw the line between patriotism and nationalism? Let's begin with a description (incomplete) of what nationalism involves: a strong sense of peoplehood, first of all; an engagement with a shared history, culture, and language. Perhaps significantly, the word "language" doesn't appear in Smith's index, though he disdains Esperanto (as nationalists certainly do), and he sometimes produces lists like this one of the things that all human beings rightly value: "family, language, country, traditions, and way of life."[58] These words together make a common nationalist trope. When French academicians defend the purity of the French language, I would be inclined to say they are acting as nationalists rather than patriots. The effort of a people to find political arrangements that provide for the continuation of their history and the preservation of their culture and language—this is the standard nationalist project.

Patriotism is perhaps more narrow, more related to a particular political regime than to anything like peoplehood. So, for example, Athenians and Spartans were patriotic; Greeks, united against the Persians, were nationalists, though they didn't use the word. Florentines were patriots (Italian nationalism was not yet on the horizon). The citizens of Singapore are patriots; the Chinese (the Han Chinese) are nationalists.

But that distinction isn't good enough for people living in the Westphalian world system (which is where we still are). So perhaps we should say that nation-states are likely to be produced by and to produce nationalism, whereas multinational states, like the United States, where politics rather than language and history holds the state together, might incline citizens toward patriotism. Smith suggests that the United States is a "creedal" state, whose citizens are bound to one another through a shared commitment to the Declaration and the Constitution. If nationalism appeals to the gut, patriotism appeals more to the mind. So, Canadians (is this right?) should be patriotically committed to their federal regime; the Quebecois are nationalists.

That might work, though it is important to recognize that creedal patriotism is not always enlightened. It often leads patriots

to persecute dissidents who do not accept (every part of) the creed—as when the House Un-American Activities Committee went after communists and "fellow travelers." The Soviet Union was definitely a creedal state, where communism was the creed and noncommunists were treated as anti-Soviet subversives and state enemies—which was much worse than being un-American. By contrast, nation-states identify enemies differently: no one doubts that Italian communists are good Italians; there has never been an Un-Italian Activities Committee (as Smith notes).[59] Or, in the words of Yael Tamir in her book *Liberal Nationalism*, Charles de Gaulle never doubted that Jean-Paul Sartre was a "respected member of the French nation."[60]

Consider a few pithy examples of current uses of the word "patriot." At his state funeral Robert Dole was, again and again, called a patriot. In the recent elections in Hong Kong, the candidates allowed to run for office (in contrast to those not allowed) were also called patriots. I think that the Chinese commitment to control Hong Kong (and Tibet and Taiwan) is a nationalist commitment, but maybe not.

Creedal states are presumably open to anyone who accepts the creed, whereas nation-states belong to the members of the nation and commonly privilege national kinfolk over any other potential immigrants. Perhaps that is the key difference—though then we would have to worry about US immigration policy over the years, which has been racially and ethnically discriminatory (as if there actually was an American nation). We haven't gone looking for immigrants who know and love constitutional democracy—how could we do that? And would the exclusion of the others be justified?

Liberal, but not illiberal, nations do take in foreigners, refugees, and asylum seekers; they encourage naturalization and integration. And liberal, but not illiberal, nationalists live comfortably alongside national minorities. Recently, however, we have seen many more illiberal than liberal nationalists. Mazzini doesn't seem like a twenty-first-century model—which may be what drives Smith's distinction.

Smith takes de Gaulle to be the quintessential French patriot, so let's linger for a moment with him. Despite his cultural conservatism, Smith writes, de Gaulle remained "devoted to the republic and the principles of 1789."[61] But I imagine that other European leaders thought of de Gaulle as a pretty tough French nationalist, and his long opposition to, and reluctant acceptance of, Algerian independence might mark him as an illiberal nationalist—at the end, a chastened illiberal nationalist. His defense of the Quebecois (because they speak French) was definitely a nationalist project.

Perhaps "patriot" and "nationalist" are overlapping terms. There certainly are enlightened French patriots who value the principles of 1789—as well as unenlightened French patriots who are focused more exclusively on family, language, country, traditions, and way of life—and have no interest in or are even critical of the revolutionary declarations. The latter group could also be called nationalists, and some of them might qualify as liberal nationalists, who admire other languages, countries, and so on. More of them would probably be illiberal nationalists, who view other nations, and foreigners generally, as threats to French cultural integrity and well-being.

The farther I go, the more confused I am. But I see a way forward. Both terms are used politically for different purposes—that is, for good and bad, right and wrong purposes. Smith's aim in this book is to defend an "aspirational" version of American patriotism—a creedal commitment, so it is vital to get the creed right: it means equality, constitutional democracy, and rule of law, above all.[62] So Smith would certainly argue that the January 6 insurgents, who called themselves patriots, got it wrong. But what about Robert Dole? He was a patriot in the conventional sense, but maybe not in Smith's creedal sense. In an age of economic, racial, and gender inequality, Dole was not an aspirational (or a practical) egalitarian. (If you look for Smith's book on Amazon, the website directs you to "other books you might like"—all of them by conservative authors. But aspirational patriotism might well have a critical edge.)

Nationalism can also be an aspirational commitment. A latter-day follower of Mazzini, for example, would certainly have

criticized Benito Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia—the young Italian nationalists aspired to a world of independent nations. Today, Israel's occupation of the West Bank is criticized in the name of Zionist (and Jewish) ideals. On this view, many nationalists, perhaps most these days, get their nationalism wrong.

So, what's important is not patriotism itself but a patriotism committed to certain values (and not others). Americans are lucky that those values figured largely in the founding of the republic, which makes it relatively easy to identify and defend Smith's patriotism. We would have to worry, then, about current revisionist descriptions of America's founding—as liberal Israelis might worry about revisionist versions of Zionism. Patriotism and nationalism both work best when they have a history of principled aspiration to which patriots and nationalists can refer.

Response to Critics

Steven B. Smith
Yale University

Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes
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Let me begin by saying how grateful I am to the contributors to this symposium on my book *Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes*. Whatever the differences between us, I could not possibly have asked for a more thoughtful engagement with my book. Let me address some of issues raised by them in the order in which they appear.

Wilfred McClay rightly notes that this could not have been an easy book to write in today's academic climate. I must admit, however, that one of the secret pleasures I experienced was observing the expressions of shock—sometimes horror—on the faces of colleagues when I said that I was writing a book defending patriotism.

Bill and I are on the same page when it comes to decrying "woke" perfectionism as the worst obstacle to progressive reform. Wokeness is just the most recent example of a reform movement that has become so certain of its rectitude that it is unable to hear any voices other than its own. My book is an attempt in part to rescue patriotism, if not for the Left, at least for the center-left.

Bill finds one of the "few weaknesses" in the book to be an abhorrence of Donald Trump—on this charge I plead guilty—that prevents me from engaging more sympathetically with the concerns of his voters. Although my book is not about Trump and the few times he is mentioned I tried to put him in the context of the rise of global populism, Bill is correct that he represents a "negative reference point." Let me put it this way. In 2016, I did my best to

try to understand the appeal of Trump and the concerns of his voters. At moments, I allowed myself to believe that a Trump presidency might act as a kind of ideological arbitrator between the parties, willing to act opportunistically with each in order to solve issues of pressing national importance. Four years later, that hope seemed painfully naïve.

From the beginning, Trump's call to lock up his opponent, his encouragement of violence against protesters, his call on Russia to intervene in the election, and, of course, more recently his championing of the Big Lie to cast doubt on the integrity of our electoral system seem to me to put him beyond the pale. Even as I write, he has yet to utter a word of criticism of Putin's war on Ukraine. If conservatives are right—and I think they are—when they remind us that words have consequences, I can say only that I take his words (or the lack of them) seriously. I cannot account for the millions of our fellow citizens who continue to support this man, but I hope at some time they will disenthrall themselves of his example.

At the core of Sanford Levinson's response is his own disillusionment with the US Constitution, which he finds as the source of disunion rather than national unity. He finds my defense of "constitutional faith"—a term I learned from him!—to be perplexing.[63] I will not pretend to teach constitutional law to a constitutional lawyer, but we differ over how we read our history.

Sandy cites the authority of my colleague Bruce Ackerman when he claims that our constitutional history has been punctuated by "tectonic shifts" and "political tsunamis" brought about by the post–Civil War amendments and the Civil Rights Movement. I disagree. France has lived under multiple constitutional moments—they are now enjoying their Fifth Republic—that have been interrupted by returns to monarchy and even a period of foreign occupation during World War II. Our experience has been nothing like this. To recognize the unity of our tradition is not "to blind Americans to the all-important history of significant change," as Sandy notes, but to recognize that change has occurred within a single constitutional framework that has withstood the test of time.

Every discipline creates its own *deformation professionelle*. In legal studies, this is the peculiar view that courts and judges are the movers and shapers of history. In the case of the Reconstruction amendments, the courts did nothing more than ratify what had already been accomplished by boots on the ground—namely, the complete destruction of the Southern slaveocracy, thereby ensuring, in Abraham Lincoln's words, that those previously enslaved would be "thenceforward and forever free."

A second point on which we disagree concerns the importance of Lincoln. While professing deep respect and admiration for Lincoln, Sandy wonders whether Frederick Douglass's description of him as "preeminently the white man's president" is not closer to the truth than my own description of him as "America's greatest patriot." He repeats the old canard that even until very late in life Lincoln supported "colonization" for repatriating Blacks to Africa or Panama.

I do not claim to challenge Douglass's perception of Lincoln or to speak for anyone other than myself, but I would say that it is the continual focus on "white supremacy" and not the Constitution that is a principal cause of our disharmony. We can recognize our faults without wallowing in them as advocates of the "1619 Project" would do. Recall that Douglass broke with the radical abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison precisely for the latter's belief that slavery was baked into the Constitution ("an agreement with Hell"), a view lamentably shared by many in the academy today. Lincoln and Douglass both believed that the original Constitution may have been compromised by slavery but still carried the germ of an emancipatory message, and that is my belief, too.

At the end of the day, Sandy wonders whether his own negative assessment of the Constitution would put him outside my patriotic universe. If it makes any difference, don't worry, you're still in.

Jeremy Bailey paints a largely accurate picture of my book while noting I am more concerned with defending patriotism from those on the right than on the left, a point challenged by some of the other readers represented in this symposium. The book, he writes, "offers an admonition to the young patriot who does not

understand the danger of his own love of country." My own (perhaps too) inclusive view is able to accommodate everyone from James Madison and Abraham Lincoln to Walt Whitman, Martin Luther King Jr., and Bruce Springsteen, whose patriotic anthem "Land of Hope and Dreams" is quoted near the end of my book and deserves a place in the American canon.

Nevertheless, Jeremy finds fault with the fact that I have overlooked the central role played by choice and reflection in the construction of American patriotism. "Patriotism," he writes in a beautiful sentence, "honors not only what we have inherited but what we have built and, in the case of the immigrant, what we have chosen." Consent is the necessary condition for the exercise of rightful authority.

There is, I think, some truth in Jeremy's critique. I probably did not give the role of active consent and volition the attention it deserves. But note the irony. By focusing on the categories of choice and reflection, Jeremy is offering a more "liberal" reading of patriotism than mine. Patriotism, as I argue in my book, is in part a creed, a set of ideas, an aspiration, but it is also an ethos; it is not something that we choose so much as we inhabit. At one point, I compare it to a house that has grown a bit ramshackle over time but is still the place we call home. This is in part because we choose to live there, but also because we find it hard to imagine living anywhere else.

There is a further irony. Those of us who were born here do not choose to become Americans. We inherit our identities at birth. Our consent is simply a ratification of what we have already become. The only ones who can truly be said to exercise choice are immigrants who come to our shores whether driven by necessity or out of their own free will. Ours may be the only country in the world where the act of becoming a citizen is called a "naturalization process."

Yiftah Elazar's response draws on Richard Price's *Discourse of the Love of Our Country* (1798), unfortunately not discussed in my book. Here Price—the object of Burke's ire in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*—treats patriotism as the passion to

enlighten, emancipate, and improve the condition of one's fellow citizens. It is Exhibit A of patriotism as an aspirational idea. But here is the problem. Yiftah finds my patriotism insufficiently attentive to the darker reality of the term. "Patriotism," he avers, "is much too often, perhaps more often than not, unreflective and excessive, a source and an instrument of exclusion, oppression, and unjustified killing and dying." That is a heavy indictment.

I don't necessarily disagree. Can patriotism be misused? Of course. What good thing cannot? The demand for justice may deafen us to the appeals of mercy; the concern for equality may ignore the claims for excellence; the insistence on freedom can overlook the needs for social order. In one of my favorite essays, "In Praise of Inconsistency," the great philosopher Leszek Kolakowski argues that the grossest inhumanities are committed by the people who cling to the idea of acting out of absolute moral consistency.[64] All the good things in life are susceptible to abuse, and certainly patriotism falls into this category. The point is how to apply this category with moderation, intelligence, and enlightenment. My question intended not to dwell on the abuses of patriotism but to explore its possibilities.

The area where Yiftah and I are most likely in disagreement concerns my treatment of the cosmopolitan left. He believes I have been too dismissive of the new progressives, and while he and I probably share similar doubts about the Davos elites, he says my work would have been improved by addressing the ethical commitments of Mother Teresa and Greta Thunberg. Let me do so now. For the former, I was largely convinced by Christopher Hitchens's take down in *The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice*;[65] and as for the latter, I refuse to take my marching orders from the dogmatic moralizing of a teenager.

Yiftah asks whether I was wrong to speak of contemporary nationalists as patriotism's "overzealous friends" while treating cosmopolitans and progressives as the enemies of enlightened patriotism. I think this is an overstatement, since I frequently mention the progressive and inclusive dimensions of Lincoln's patriotism. My position can best be summed up in Lincoln's own

words in his 1854 Peoria speech: "Stand with anybody that stands right. Stand with him while he is right and part with him when he goes wrong."[66]

I want to thank Nicholas Buccola for putting my book into conversation with two giants of American literature, Frederick Douglass and James Baldwin. These two writers offered immensely complex and achingly moving reflections on what it means to be Black in America. As he puts it in his best sentence, "So much of the meaning of the country is to be found at the 'margins,' and so too might be the wisdom necessary for our redemption."

I cannot go into Nick's masterly reconstruction of Baldwin's rich body of thought on America that runs from "tough love"—my own version of "patriotic resistance"—to despair. Baldwin's most striking utterance was to me a statement written while living in Paris when he says of his country, "I missed the style—that style possessed by no other people in the world." As an aesthetic term, the concept of style suggests that any affective patriotism must begin with the real experiences of everyday life, the food, the smells, the people who cannot be produced anywhere else. This captures a deep truth about American exceptionalism.

I must admit that I do not know Baldwin's work. Apart from a college course on African American literature taken over forty years ago when I read *Notes from the Mountain*, I cannot recall ever reading anything else by him. This is a sad admission, especially because I am a great admirer of Nick's magnificent book *The Fire Is upon Us* about the debate between Baldwin and William F. Buckley at Cambridge University in February, 1965.[67] I will use this occasion to promise publicly to do better.

Last, but certainly not least, Michael Walzer offers his own views on the distinction I draw between patriotism and nationalism. This is the part of the book that has drawn the most comment from other reviewers. Our differences can be stated simply: he tends to lean more to the nationalist and I to the patriotic side of the ledger. Of course, the nationalism he defends is liberal nationalism, and the patriotism I defend is enlightened patriotism. But what is the difference?

The question Michael puts on the table is whether nationalism can be redeemed today for liberal purposes. To be sure, nationalism was originally a youth movement promising liberation from the sclerotic imperial states of its day. Nationalists like Giuseppe Mazzini, Abraham Lincoln, William Gladstone, and Theodor Herzl were all liberal nationalists. Michael likes nationalism, as do I, when it claimed to speak to people's hopes and aspirations, a point he has explored at length in his great book *The Paradox of Liberation*.[68]

My sense is that the rise of militant nationalism in the twentieth and now the twenty-first century has made the concept unusable for liberal purposes. To give one example from my book: the term "white nationalism" makes perfect sense; the term "white patriot" is an oxymoron. As I argue in my book, things were not always this way. French president Emmanuel Macron and Harvard historian Jill Lepore were wrong to say that patriotism is the opposite of nationalism. They in fact grow out of the same tree. Nationalism took a wrong turn only when it began to identify the nation as the sole source of human identity, a story that was brilliantly told in Elie Kedourie's still path-breaking book *Nationalism*.[69]

Michael raises the legitimate objection that my idea of American creedal patriotism has been subject to a variety of abuses (e.g., the House Un-American Activities Committee). Soviet Russia, he reminds us, was also a creedal state, with the official creed being communism. I will say to him only what I said earlier to Yiftah Elazar. The fact that something can be used is no guarantee against its misuse. The point of my book was not to dwell on the sins of patriotism—George Kateb has done this well and at length—but to try to create an affirmative idea of American patriotism that can serve as a rallying point against the illiberal forces of both the right and the left.[70]

Finally, Michael notes that the Amazon website for my book directs the reader to a range of books, all by conservative authors. I cannot help this. The language of patriotism—and nationalism—comes more easily to conservatives than to liberals. I had hoped the book might cause at least some liberals to reengage with patriotism; however, the vast majority of podcasts and interviews I have done

since the book was published have been with conservative (or former conservative) groups ranging from a Christian radio station in Alabama to the Lincoln Project.

I have no control over who reads my book, and as far as I am concerned, the more the better. I am reminded of a line by Michael Jordan: when asked to support a Democratic candidate in North Carolina, he replied, "Republicans buy sneakers, too."

I wish to thank my readers again for the time and effort they spent engaging with my book.

Notes

1. Steven B. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021), 192.
2. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 149.
3. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 150.
4. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 6 September 1823, in *The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 1776–1826*, ed. James Morton Smith (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 1877–78. This exchange is discussed in Jeremy D. Bailey, *James Madison and Constitutional Imperfection*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 143–49.
5. Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, 8 May 1825, in *Thomas Jefferson: Writings*, ed. Merril Peterson (New York: Library of America, 1984), 1501.
6. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 116, 114.
7. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 140–42.
8. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 116.
9. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 159–60.
10. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 161.
11. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 3.
12. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 190.
13. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 191.
14. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 192.
15. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 193.
16. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 195.
17. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 196.
18. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 197.
19. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 198.
20. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 200.

21. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 201.
22. Brian Steele, *Thomas Jefferson and American Nationhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 21–37.
23. Thomas Jefferson, "A Summary View of the Rights of British America," in *Writings*, 106–7.
24. Thomas Jefferson, "A Summary View of the Rights of British America," in *Writings*, 105–6.
25. Thomas Jefferson, "Second Inaugural Address," in *Writings*, 520.
26. Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 11 June 1812, in *The Adams–Jefferson Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams*, ed. Lester J. Cappon (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 308. See also Jefferson to William H. Harrison, 27 February 1803, in *Writings*, 1117–20.
27. Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 1," in *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1961), 3.
28. George Kateb, "Is Patriotism a Mistake?" *Social Research* 67, no. 4 (2000): 901–24.
29. Richard Price, "A Discourse on the Love of Our Country," in *Political Writings*, ed. D. O. Thomas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 176–96.
30. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 186.
31. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" (Lawrence: University of Kansas, Department of Philosophy, 1984).
32. Stephen Nathanson, "In Defense of 'Moderate Patriotism,'" *Ethics* 99, no. 3 (1989): 535–52; Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 491–515; Maurizio Viroli, *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Robert T. Schatz, Ervin Staub, and Howard Lavine, "On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind versus Constructive Patriotism," *Political Psychology* 20, no. 1 (1999): 151–74; Marcia Baron and Taylor Rogers, "Patriotism and Impartiality," in *Handbook of Patriotism*, ed. Mitja Sardoc (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 409–27; Yiftah Elazar, "Adam Smith on Impartial Patriotism," *Review of Politics* 83, no. 3 (2021): 329–50.
33. George Orwell, "Notes on Nationalism," in *Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*, ed. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. 3, *As I Please, 1943–1945* (New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1968), 361–80; Viroli, *Love of Country*.

34. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 144.
35. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 17.
36. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 130–31.
37. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 9.
38. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 9.
39. On the potential value of resentment, see Michelle Schwarze, *Recognizing Resentment: Sympathy, Injustice, and Liberal Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
40. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 4.
41. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 9.
42. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 5.
43. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 190–203.
44. What Would Lincoln Do?
45. Frederick Douglass, "What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?" *The Essential Douglass*, ed. Nicholas Buccola (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2016), 59.
46. Frederick Douglass, "The Inaugural Address," in *The Essential Douglass,*150–51.
47. James Baldwin, "Autobiographical Notes," in *Collected Essays*, ed. Toni Morrison (New York: Library of America, 1998), 9.
48. Fred R. Standley and Louis H. Pratt, eds., *Conversations with James Baldwin* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1989), 286.
49. James Baldwin, "The Creative Process," in *Collected Essays*, 669–72.
50. James Baldwin, "Faulkner and Desegregation," in *Collected Essays*, 212.
51. James Baldwin, "Down at the Cross," *Collected Essays*, 310.
52. Baldwin, "Down at the Cross," 310
53. *I Am Not Your Negro: A Major Motion Picture*, Directed by Raoul Peck, From Texts by James Baldwin (New York: Vintage, 2016), 13–14.
54. Baldwin, "Down at the Cross," 343.
55. James Baldwin, "Everybody's Protest Novel," *Collected Essays*, 12.
56. Baldwin, "Down at the Cross," 314. The passage actually reads, "If the concept of God has any validity or any use, it can only be to make us larger, freer, and more loving. If God cannot do this, then it is time we got rid of Him."
57. James Baldwin, "Take Me to the Water," in *Collected Essays*, 358.
58. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 142.
59. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 203.
60. Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), xx.
61. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, 137.

62. Smith, *Reclaiming Patriotism*, chap. 6.
63. Sanford Levinson, *Constitutional Faith* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
64. Leszek Kolakowski, "In Praise of Inconsistency," in *Toward a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today*, trans. Jane Zielonko Peel (New York: Grove Press, 1968), 211–20.
65. Christopher Hitchens, *The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice* (London: Verso, 1995).
66. Abraham Lincoln, "Speech on the Kansas–Nebraska Act at Peoria," *The Writings of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Steven B. Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 83.
67. Nicholas Buccola, *The Fire Is upon Us: James Baldwin, William F. Buckley, and the Debate over Race in America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019).
68. Michael Walzer, *The Paradox of Liberation: Secular Revolutions and Religious Counterrevolutions* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2015).
69. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
70. George Kateb, "Is Patriotism a Mistake?" *Social Research* 67 (2000): 901–24.